Why Mahinda is turning govt into an elephant orphanage
January 13th, 2007
By D.B.S. Jeyaraj
Two important events took place last week. One was the release to the All party Representative Conference (APRC) by its chairman Prof Tissa Vitharana of a comprehensive report on recommendations on Constitutional reform. The other was an endorsement by cabinet of a decision by President Mahinda Raapakse to encourage and accept MP”s crossing over to Government ranks from the chief opposition United National Party (UNP).
Though seemingly unrelated both events are tied up to a great extent.From the perspective of President Rajapakse one act has necessitated the other.The president is troubled by the direction in which the APRC is proceeding. He needs to stop , sidetrack or re- direct the APRC without being blamed. For this he needs to ruin all chances of the APRC arriving at a viable and progressive consensus.
The key element in any possible “Southern ” consensus would be a bilateral consensus between the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the UNP. So in order to undermine that possibility Mahinda is trying to sabotage the SLFP – UNP Memorandum of understanding. The best way seems to be that of turning his Government into another Pinnawela Elephant orphanage. All “elephants” crossing over from the UNP will be given asylym with perks and privileges in Govt ranks. Bang! There goues the MOU between the SLFP and UNP.
The inability and unwillingness of both the major “Sinhala” national parties in forging a common approach towards the Tamil national question has contributed greatly towards the deterioration of ethnic relations in the country.For the first time in recent history a great breakthrough was achieved when the UNP and SLFP reached an agreement last October. One of the four areas agreed upon was arriving at a solution to the ethnic problem on a joint basis. At last the elusive Southern consensus seemed to be in sight.
Between them both parties had nearly two – thirds of MP’s in Parliament. If the SLFP and UNP agreed on a common but viable scheme of Constitutional reform that would usher in a just and fair deal to the Tamil and Muslim people most minority community parties would have supported it. The old left parties would also have done the same. This would have isolated the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU).
Even they may have been compelled to fall in line in a situation where the greens, blues and “old” reds along with Tamil and Muslim parties were together. The envisaged referendum too would have been a cakewalk. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) too may have been flummoxed by this development.
When Mahinda Rajapakse convened an all party conference in September last year and also appointed a panel of experts to assist it all those sections who think Rajapakse will “do the right thing” were elated.The President solemnly pledged to implement the consensus decision. With the SLFP – UNP accord the euphoria increased. The chances of a viable Southern consensus being reached loomed large on the horizon.
The UNP very wisely said that they would enter the APRC deliberations after the conference produced a working draft. All past attempts to resolve the issue through all – party conferences have been time consuming, meandering, profitless exercises. The mountains laboured and brought forth mice. The UNP stance therefore gave a sense of purpose to the APRC. It had to produce and produce quickly.
All this of course depended on the bona fides of Mahinda Rajapakse.If he was really sincere in his professed intention of resolving the national question through a political solution here was his chance. The APRC aided by the expert panel had to come out with a draft scheme as quickly as possibly. Then the UNP had to come in. But in the final analysis realpolitik decreed that the SLFP and UNP had to reach an understanding.
But it soon became apparent to the politically astute that Rajapakse was playing for time. The APRC was only an exercise to project an appearance that the President was keen on a political settlement. This was to keep the Western nations and India and Japan happy that Colombo was really in pursuit of a political settlement. It was also intended to boost his image. “Apey” Mahinda was really a dove with hawkish feathers.
While the APRC continued in Colombo “terrible twins” Gotha and Sarath were to unleash war in the North – East. Mahinda felt or had been convinced that annihilation of the tigers was possible. All it needed was some time and an unrestrained, ferocious onslaught that would take little note of civilian casualties. Like many southern hardliners this Ruhunu puthra too entertained ambitions of being a latter – day Rohana.
The International community (IC) and India had to get off Colombo’s back and allow it a free hand. Like JR Jayewardena and R. Premadasa acting in the past , Mahinda too was using the all – party conference as a time – buying show to keep IC pressure at bay. There was also a need to get sustained finances from the IC to make war on the Tamils.For all this the appearance of a political quest through the APRC was a must.
Rajapakse known for his political acumen and cunning ensured that the APRC would not deliver. He left out the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) on the grounds that the pro – LTTE party would not engage in constructive discussions and would be an impediment to smooth progress of the APRC. Yet parties like the JVP and JHU along with the Mahajama Eksath Peramuna (MEP) were participants. A Tamil extremist party like the TNA was bad but Sinhala extremist parties were good. Funny eh?
The Expert panel too was “packed”. Notable Sinhala people with hardline positions were appointed along with other respected moderates. The chairman was eminent lawyer HL de Silva who along with another “expert” Gomin Dayasiri argued successfully for a de – merger of the North – East. It was essentially a Sinhala panel with only one Tamil and one Muslim at first.
Subsequently International pressure resulted in more Tamils being added. Some Tamil experts were proposed by the late Kethesh Loganathan and Palitha Kohona. Among those considered were Nirmala Chandrahasan, N. Selvakumaran, K. Vigneswaran, Devanesan Nesiah and MA Sumanthiran. President Rajapakse selected the first three.
The APRC as well as the expert panel was deeply divided. A satisfactory consensus emerging was seemingly impossible. If a common position was reached it would have been heavily diluted in favour of a hardline Sinhala position. This would make the LTTE reject it unconditionally as a basis for discussions. It would also have been easier for Rajapakse to push it down Tamil throats on the grounds that it was a Southern consensus. The IC may have pressed Tamils to accept it. While these happenings were on Mahinda’s mighty army would have demolished the LTTE. Thereafter it was Hobson’s choice for Tamils.
But the best laid plans of men and mice go awry. This happens to even people with leonine pretensions. Opposition to HL de Silva from within the expert panel made him step down . MPP Peiris was made chairman. The polarisation within the expert panel did not turn ethnic. To their credit several Sinhala experts transcended their ethnic limits in forging together a reasonable and just scheme for the betterment of the entire nation and not for a particular ethnicity alone. Eleven of Seventeen experts comprising six Sinhala, four Tamil and One Muslim endorsed Report A or the majority report. Four Sinhala experts presented Report B or the minority report. Two others presented a dissenting report each
The Constitutonal exercise may have gone on and on till Mahinda’s “chinthana” of a military victory was achieved but for one factor – India!. New Delhi increased pressure on Colombo to deliver and deliver quickly. Finally Rajapakse assured Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon that a draft report will be ready by Dec 15th last year. There was frantic speed thereafter. With the APRC wandering aimlessly the onus was on the expert panel to produce a worthwhile report. The panel rose to the occasion but reflected the chasms within by releasing four reports on Dec 7th.
Still report A presented by a multi – ethnic majority was a good one. It was very welcome from an ethnic minority point of view. At the same time it was satisfactory from a moderate Sinhala perspective too. But the hawks clamouring for a Sinhala supremacist Sri Lanka were unhappy. If Rajapakse was genuine about wanting to resolve the problem through maximum devolution he would naturally have embraced the majority expert report and backed it. He did not do so.
Instead Rajapakse distanced himself from the majority expert report. He got cabinet spokesmam Priyadharshana Yapa to come out with a convoluted statement disassociating the Govt from the report. An orchestrated campaign went ahead with presidential blessings to discredit the report and those who endorsed it.There were reports that some of those who signed it would be officially reprimanded. There were also puerile allegations about the report being leaked to the media. Interestingly it was not very long ago that Chandrika Kumaratunga described Mahinda as “reporter” insinuating that he was leaking cabinet secrets to the media.
One reason for Rajapakse’s discomfiture and anger was that he did not expect the expert panel majority to come out with such a commendable report. It was expected that it would be an insipid product. It was on Dec 3rd that copies of Committee A draft report was made available to experts. The “saffronistas” rushed to the President on Dec 4th. Rajapakse saw “taras” when he knew of the majority report. The contents were not to his liking.
An assurance was obtained from the experts that the report should be kept confidential. All reports were to be presented to the APRC. Thereafter the conference would debate the pros and cons and forge another “common” report. The corridors of power envisaged the suppression of the majority expert report through this subterfuge. The end product of the APRC would have been a watered down affair enshrining the unitary state and devolving minimum powers.
But again “apey” Mahinda was foiled. This time it was the media. The Rajapakse’s have through their carrot and stick methods compelled many sections of the media to fall in line. Not all however have lost their independence. The reports were all out in the public domain. Those who read them were able to compare the reports and arrive at their own conclusions. Above all members of the IC read them and began rooting for the majority expert report. The UNP also registered approval of the majority report.
Under these circumstances it was difficult now to jettison the report A. But there was the APRC. The only hope was to get it whittled down through that. Subsequent APRC meetings could not do much on that front..In a bid to take the process forward APRC chairman and cabinet minister Tissa Vitharane announced that he would select the best features of all four reports and incorporate them into another report. This report could form the basis for further APRC discussions.Many were perturbed at this and thought Vitharana would be made a cat’spaw presenting a watered down version.
One does not know whether Rajapakse expected Vitharana to compile a mild, watered down report. But the veteran Trotskyite and nephew of Dr. NM Perera did the Samasamaajists proud by coming out with a stellar product. Vitharana presented the report under “confidential” cover to the APRC delegates on Jan 8th.It was titled “Main proposals to form the basis of a future constitution”. Adding to the upbeat mood was the UNP position articulated ably by NK Choksy. The UNP too had adopted a very commendable stance.
Once again the free media came out with details of the Vitharana report. “The Morning Leader” of Jan 10th scooped it. The newspaper announced that the Tissa Vitharana report had many features similiar to that of the majority expert report. Substantial sections of the Vitharana proposals were similiar to that of Report A.
This writer is yet to examine the Vitharana proposals in full and compare it in detail with the Majority report.. A quick read shows that it has indeed taken many points and suggestions fom the majority report. There are changes in some areas like providing asymmetrical devolution to the North – East or setting up of a zonal council for Up Country Tamils. On the question of unit the Vitharana report leaves it open. Even the majority report did not come out with a definite conclusion but proposed four options.
One of those was to keep the N- E merger on for a period of ten years and then hold a referendum on it. The UNP too has proposed that the merger remain for 6 – 8 years and then have a referendum. The Supreme Court decision was based on legality and pronounced the merger invalid on procedural grounds. The political question remains untouched. With the UNP ready to coperate Rajapakse can through simple legislation re – merge the two provinces subject to a referendum at a later date after peace and a settlement is on the cards.Vitharana’s proposals envisage such a re – merger.
The Rajapakse regime however has gone ahead with de – merging the provinces. Two separate administrations are being set up. Army chief Sarath Fonseka has announced that they would bring the East under control first and then the North. If Rajapakse is successful in this – and that is a very big if – two elections will be held for the East and North provincial councils.Karuna and Douglas may have “chinthanas” about heading these councils respectively.
Against the backdrop of such grandiose plans the proposals in both the expert majority and Vitharana reports run contrary to Mahinda’s aspirations. . Though Vitharana was present at Rajapakse’s meeting with Pranab Mukherjee to assure the Indian Foreign minister that the political quest was proceeding smoothly the contents of his report are anathema to any president nursing lofty ambitions of military conquest. Mahinda wants to “slow ” down on the political front while moving “fast” on the military front.
Vitharana however explained salient aspects about progress made in the APRC and expert panel deliberations. After outlining the important points in his proposals Vitharana provided copies to the Indian delegation. Though the presence of Vitharana at the meeting with Mujherjee helped the President convey an impression that he was keen on a political settlement Rajapakse is having second thoughts about the APRC.
Thanks to the majority expert report and the Vitharana proposals the APRC is becoming a liability to Rajapakse. It is not going in the direction he anticipated. Instead quietly assertive dedicated persons who place the long – term interests of the Country above the short – term political ambitions of the “sataka” have in their own way expressed dissent. Furthermore the energies of the APRC is likely to be channelled on a progressive course in the future.
All this makes Rajapakse wary. It is time perhaps for the APRC to be stymied. It has outlived its usefulness to Rajapakse. But he cannot afford to dissolve it now after the contents of the Vitharana report have been made public via the media. There is also India and the IC. One way would be for Rajapakse to keep up the appearance of the APRC while making sure that it would not deliver without the blame being attached to him directly.
For this the UNP has to be eased out of the poliical quest. As stated in these columns earlier a meaningful Southern consensus is possible only if the UNP and SLFP come together. Realistically a SLFP – UNP bi – partisan consensus is more important than a wider all – party consensus. It was only a few weeks ago that this column stated the constitutional reform ball was in the SLFP – UNP court. What is necessary for Rajapakse is to get the UNP pull out of its accord with the SLFP. If that happens a Sinhala consensus would be out. Rajapakse can wriggle out of a commitment to introduce and implement a political soultion
It is with this underlying motive that Rajapakse now wants the treasury benches turned into a Pinnawela elephant orphanage. He is welcoming with open arms all “alipati” breaking ranks with the main herd. A rogue elephant here and there too would be enticed. Stating that no snap elections would be held and promising minister and deputy – minister posts to “cross overs” Rajapakse hopes to attract about 16 – 18 MP’s at first. His decision has been endorsed by cabinet
If this plan materialises it would violate the spirit of the SLFP – UNP accord. One of the important if not solitary factors that impelled Ranil Wickremasinghe into forging an understanding with the SLFP was to prevent such desertion of his MP’s. Though Rajapakse says that accepting UNP Parliamentarians into Govt ranks would not hamper the SLFP – UNP accord. This is simply not true. He may say that it does not violate the spirit of the agreement but it certainly does. Mahinda knows it. He also knows that this act would ring the death – knell of the SLFP – UNP accord.
If that happens the Constututional reform process would lose validity and credibility. The APRC would go through the motions without anything tangible being achieved. Mahinda would have achieved his goal.
This is why Mahinda wants to sabotage the SLFP – UNP accord by wooing MP’s from the UNP. The idea is not merely to strengthen Govt ranks but also to engineer a breakdown in relations with the UNP. This would make the Constitutional reform process a meaningless facade.. The Rajapakse regime would then be free to promote war.
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