Archive for January 12th, 2008
by Rajan Philips
“Pakistan, the peeling, fragmenting palimpsest, increasingly at war with itself, may be described as a failure of the dreaming mind…a miracle that went wrong.” Salman Rushdie’s old description of Pakistan has come alive again in the wake of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination and the aftermath of chaos and uncertainty. Pakistan has faced crisis after crisis from the moment of its creation, which was a miracle in more than a literary sense. But sixty years after the partition of British India and thirty six years after the severance of East Pakistan (as Bangladesh), Pakistan is a social and political reality of 162 million people who form the sixth largest national population in the world. The people of Pakistan deserve more than a failing miracle.
For the first twenty five years after partition and independence, Pakistan’s main challenge was keeping the two wings of the country, separated by a vast Indian territory, together as a nation state. The leaders of Pakistan went to extraordinarily counterproductive lengths to meet this challenge, seemingly obsessed with proving wrong the cynical Indian skepticism about Pakistan’s survivability. Their efforts failed with the breakup of old Pakistan, in 1971, into Bangladesh and the current Pakistan, and the hangovers from the failed attempts are still haunting Pakistan. In addition, new predicaments have emerged in the last thirty five years.
Both Bangladesh and Pakistan have shown their propensity to alternate between civilian and military rules, but whereas Bangladesh’s difficulties are mostly internal and often compounded by floods and famines, Pakistan’s predicaments are internal and external, national as well as international. The seamless spread of Islamic radicalism from West Asia and the involvement in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union has led to the talibanisation of Pakistani society, even as it has transformed the nature of Pakistan’s conflict with India over Kashmir. On the other hand, President Musharraf’s ‘official’ fight against the al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as part of the US retaliation against the 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on America, is tearing apart Pakistani society. The country is again “at war with itself”, as Rushdie wrote earlier.
[Mohammad Ali Jinnah]
Past hangovers and new predicaments
The hangovers from the first twenty five years are also the result of Pakistan’s peculiar inheritances from British colonial rule. Chief among them were the remnants of the British Indian Army who were mostly Punjabi Muslims, and the Muslim members of the colonial bureaucracy who massively migrated to West Pakistan from Muslim-minority Provinces in India. The latter, known as Mohajirs (refugees or immigrants, whose ranks have included such famous names as Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Liquat Ali Khan, Perverz Musharraf, Javed Miandad, to name a few), who were the real instigators for a separate Muslim state, became a power unto themselves in the new Pakistan. Together with the Punjabi dominated army, Mohajirs formed the military-bureaucracy complex that has dominated Pakistan’s politics for most of its history and prevented the development of a constitutional democracy.
The main reason for foreclosing representative democracy was to prevent majority rule by East Pakistanis (Bengalis) who constituted 54% of the population. Pakistan’s leaders even contrived a one-unit arrangement in West Pakistan snuffing out the provincial, ethnic and linguistic identities of the Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns and Baluchis. English was made the official language and Urdu (spoken by about 9% of the population, mostly Mohajirs) the lingua franca of the nation. Despite Jinnah’s occasional allusions to secularism, Islam was made the state religion primarily to achieve an overarching national unity. To complete the circus, Pakistan also become America’s satellite state in South Asia, a status that suited the interests of the ruling elites and was sold to the people of Pakistan as the nation’s insurance against the enemy next door, India.
It is fair to say that the development of a secular constitutional democracy became possible on the Indian side because of more diverse inheritances from colonial rule and a postcolonial leadership that was also diverse and secular in character. As Pakistani commentator Khalid Sayeed has aptly noted, between 1950 and 1958, Pakistan had seven prime ministers and one commander-in-chief, while India had one prime minister and several commanders-in-chief. India successfully enacted and adopted a new constitution soon after independence, while Pakistan took nine years to adopt its first constitution but only to have it suspended two years later, by General Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military ruler. The second constitution was adopted in 1973 under Bhutto’s premiership and that was set aside by General Zia-ul Haq in 1978. The third constitution adopted in 1991 is currently in force, but only in name.
During the nearly dozen years of military rule under General Ayub Khan (1959-1968) and General Yahya Khan (1968-1971), Zulifikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir’s father, emerged as a prominent civilian political leader holding a variety of ministerial positions. Belonging to the Sindhi community and hailing from a wealthy landowning family, Bhutto was educated in the West, a lawyer by training and an eloquent speaker both in English and the national languages. As Foreign Minister he passionately pleaded Pakistan’s case at the UN during the East Pakistan crisis, and when the country invariably broke up took on the task of rallying what was left as the new Pakistan.
Bhutto was Pakistan’s first long serving civilian Prime Minister. He negotiated a peace agreement with India and laid the foundation for a constitutional democracy in the country. However, he faced implacable opposition from the conservative and religious sections of Pakistanis who feared Bhutto’s progressive and secular tendencies. In the end he did not bring about any radical secular changes, and lost the support of the progressives without appeasing his religious opponents. Worse, Bhutto turned autocratic and undemocratic in dealing with political opposition and dissent. Within four years of the new constitution and election he had polarized the nation, and ethnic differences involving the Sindhis, Pashtuns, Baloch and Mohajirs, long suppressed, burst out into the open. The country was at war with itself again, and once more the military took control.
General Zia-ul Haq, a religious fundamentalist handpicked by Bhutto as the Army Chief for his supposed loyalty, ousted Bhutto him from office in 1977, and had him hanged two years later on a controversial murder charge ignoring worldwide please for clemency. Zia was isolated internationally, and found in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the opportunity to rehabilitate himself with the West. He made Pakistan the bridgehead in America’s war against the communist “evil empire” on Afghan soil. Pakistan became the conduit for supplying weapons to Taliban forces in Afghanistan, weapons purchased worldwide with American money and with China being the major supplier.
Pakistan’s role led to the emergence of what Ahmad Rashid has called “an enormous nexus of corruption” pervading the entire Pakistani establishment. Ideologically, the war in Afghanistan paralleled Zia’s brutal efforts in Pakistan to impose his version of Islamic law, and paved the way for the talibanisation of many sections of Pakistani society. After the Soviet Union’s inglorious withdrawal from Afghanistan, and with America washing its hands off the resultant mess, Pakistan was left with loads of Afghan refugees on its soil and the Taliban regime in Kabul to look after.
[Ms. Bhutto, 54, waved to supporters at a campaign rally in Rawalpindi on Thursday, not long before she was assassinated.-Photo Courtesy of: NYTimes.com]
Daughter of destiny
Zia’s end came in a mysterious air crash in 1988, but his political nemesis, Benazir Bhutto, had been working independently to avenge the heinous hanging of her father. She was unique among South Asian leaders, female or male, in charming Western governments and media and presenting herself as their best option to bridge the clashing civilizations of Islam and the West. She established and maintained at considerable expense well-cultivated networks in Washington and London, using her contemporaries at Harvard and Oxford. According to the New York Times, Benazir understood Washington more than Washington understood her; she used Washington more than it used her in both her first and second political comings. It took Washington to convince the Pakistani military and the then acting President Gulam Ishaq Khan to invite Ms. Bhutto to form a new government, after her party won the largest number, but not a majority, of seats in the 1988 election following Zia-ul Haq’s death.
But for all her natural charm and inherited charisma, Benazir was a political failure. Even her sense of destiny sprang more from father fixation than any extraordinary sense of history or vision for the future of Pakistan, and she never quite succeeded in rallying the nation behind her. Her appeal did not go far beyond the followers of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) founded by her father and now bequeathed to her son, the nineteen year old Oxford University student, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. Bhutto’s two terms as Prime Minister, in 1988-1990 and 1993-1996 clearly showed that she was not only incompetent, but also autocratic and corrupt. She was thick-skinned enough to appoint her husband Asif Ali Zardari, aka Mr. 10 Percent, to her second term cabinet. Following her death, Mr. Zardari has assumed the role of being the regent for the young prince in waiting to lead the PPP, and is promising to be Pakistan’s Sonia Gandhi-looking after the (family) Party without running for election or holding public office.
Benazir’s feminism was more idiosyncratic than ideological or political and was not rooted in activism. As Pakistani women commentators have noted, Benazir faced monumental difficulties in being a political leader in a patriarchal society fed on religious fundamentalism, but the least a woman leader in such situations could be expected to do is to scrupulously avoid the failings of corruption and abuse of power associated with male politics. Benazir Bhutto showed notorious proclivity for both, not unlike other South Asian political heiresses. And so was her – again, not unlike her South Asian counterparts – selective understanding of democracy, that democracy is only for the country, but not for the Party. The Party leadership will always stay in the family.
Sacked half way through each of her two terms and facing criminal charges for corruption, Ms. Bhutto was forced to stay out of Pakistan for eight years, “living in splendid exile”, as a Western newspaper put it. She again used her Washington contacts to enable her return to Pakistan and share political power as Prime Minister, while General Musharraf remained President. The cynical opportunism in the arrangement was transparent and was reviled even by her supporters, but this was the only way Benazir Bhutto could have returned to Pakistan for a final attempt for power and restoration.
General Musharraf had taken control of Pakistan in 1999 in a power struggle with Bhutto’s rival successor as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif. Bhutto and Sharif were equally corrupt and inept, and the two had started meddling in military affairs to firm up their own positions. However, Musharraf’s ousting of an elected Prime Minister (Nawaz Sharif) did not go down well with Western powers, and Musharraf was ostracized internationally, just as Zia had been isolated earlier for hanging Bhutto. Then came the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks in the US and Musharraf seized the opportunity to rehabilitate himself, just as Zia had done after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan twenty years earlier.
This time, however, Musharraf took Pakistan in the opposite direction, against the al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and in support of the American retaliation against the Taliban government in Afghanistan. It was a bold decision that won the support of secular and moderate sections of Pakistan’s society and the wrath of religious extremists. He won praise for turning the economy around after a decade of mismanagement and corruption under Bhutto and Sharif. But all goodwill for the benign dictator evaporated when Musharraf ham-handedly took on the judiciary for ruling against his government. America’s attempt to salvage the situation by brokering a political marriage between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto has now backfired even before the ceremony could begin.
The Bush Administration is now reportedly considering new covert operations within Pakistan to prevent further destabilization of Pakistan by al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. But direct American operations are ill advised according to many in the US including the State Department, as they will only lead to a massive backlash and general instability. Musharraf for his part has indicated his opposition to any direct involvement by the US. The elections rescheduled for 18 February are unlikely to lead to a stable parliament and a new power sharing arrangement, although the consequences of not having an election could be far worse than having one.
There is no easy way out for Pakistan from its current predicaments. In its crises-ridden past, Pakistan got past each crisis by alternating between civilian and military administrations and sacking the incumbent leader as the scapegoat responsible for the crisis. Every leader reflected and personified one or the other of Pakistan’s multiple contradictions and none has left behind a positive legacy for successors to build on. Each new leader began with new support from Washington, even as each new phase began as farce and ended in tragedy, and none more so than Benazir Bhutto.
January 12th, 2008
by D.B.S.Jeyaraj
“He was a man about whom our people knew very little but our opponents however knew all about him”.
- LTTE “Col” Soosai
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) received a tremendous blow when Shanmuganathan Ravishankar alias “Col” Arulventhan a.k.a.Charles was killed with three other tigers in Mannar on Jan 5th . The white hiace van in which he was travelling along the Mannar – Pooneryn road got caught in a claymore mine explosion at a spot between Iluppaikkadavai and Pallamadhu. The time was around 3. 10 – 15 pm.
[Col. Charles]
35 year old Ravishankar joined the LTTE in his early teens in Dec 1985 . His original nom de guerre was Charles. Years later when the LTTE underwent a “Pure Tamil” transformation of names, the English name Charles was turned into Arulventhan.It was however as Charles that he was known for years to most people. Arulventhan or Charles held Lt. Col rank when killed. He was promoted posthumously as “Colonel”.
At the time of his death Ravishankar alias Charles held three leadership positions in the LTTE. He was head of the military intelligence division; he was in charge of all external operations; he was commander of a special combat unit engaged in Mannar district.
Charles was a protegee of Pottu Amman the dreaded intelligence chief of the tigers. He was an able deputy of Pottu Amman and in later life became near equal to his mentor
It is said that the efficient Charles was capable of replacing Pottu Amman if something ever happened to the chief tiger spy. The loss of Charles will be felt keenly by Tiger supremo Velupillai Prabakharan.
Ironically Charles hailing from Puloly in the Vadamaratchy division of Jaffna peninsula became “known” to most Tamil people only after his death. He was for long a clandestine operator using many pseudonyms and working undercover. He was engaged in exciting cloak and dagger antics for the LTTE and shunned limelight.
LTTE sea tiger special commander “Col” Soosai summed up the life of Charles well by saying “He was a man about whom our people knew very little but our opponents however knew all about him”. Speaking at memorial meeting in Puthukkuditiruppu , Soosai observed that the high profile attacks masterminded by the low – profile Charles had captured global attention.
Charles was travelling from Mulangaavil to Pallamadhu when his vehicle was hit by a claymore landmine. The State’s deep penetration squad was accused of being responsible by the LTTE. Three of the Militari Intelligence chief’s lieutenants were also killed in the ambush.
They were Sukanthan (Sivapalan Sreetharan) from Jeyapuram, Veeramaravan (Pararajasingham Suthan) from Mallaavi and . Kalai (Sinnaththamby Kangatharan) from Vaddakkachchi. Sukanthan was the chief bodyguard and close associate of Arulventhan/Charles.
[Procession carrying the remains of Col. Charles, Kilnochchi, 7 Jan 2008]
The LTTE is a home grown liberation movement possessing unique characteristics. Chief among these is the phenomenon of how simple sons of the Jaffna soil without tertiary education became top guerilla leaders who excelled in the discharge of duties allocated to them. Charles is one such tiger who accomplished his destructive goals at immense human cost.
For many years he worked in the LTTE’s intelligence division under the direct command of Pottu Amman. He was placed in charge of external operations, an euphemism for attacks outside the Northern and Eastern Provinces.In order to conduct such “operations” in hostile, enemy terrain an elaborate network of supportive structures has to be set up.
Reportedly , Charles was the pioneer who laid such groundwork. This, despite the fact that he had no previous contacts or experience in Colombo or other parts of Southern Sri Lanka. Until the time of his death Charles was associated with external operations in addition to other duties.
In 2004 he was appointed head of military intelligence. This involves close monitoring of all security installations and movement of security personnel. Much information has to be obtained about a key “target” before the actual operation in order to plan , co-ordinate and execute the attack.
This requires intensive reconnaissance known as “rekki ” in tiger circles. Details have to be procured from informants within military ranks also
In recent times Charles was also placed in charge of a special combat unit. This unit was related to military intelligence and deployed for special operations along the Mannar – Vavuniya district border.
This unit was not engaged in defensive operations. Instead it played a key role in launching raids on military positions held by Sri Lankan security forces. Charles was functioning in this capacity when killed.
Shanmuganathan Ravishankar was inducted into the LTTE as a student in his thirteenth year. He like many other tigers was inducted as a child soldier.The LTTE’s Jaffna commander then was Sathasivampillai Krishnakumar alias “Col” Kittu. The Vadamaratchy area chief was Thillaiambalam Sivanesan alias “Col” Soosai the present sea tiger commander.
The mid – eighties of the last century saw the security forces in Jaffna peninsula being confined to barracks through the combined efforts of all Tamil militant movements active then. The LTTE played a very important role in this. Thus most parts of Jaffna was in a state of “semi – liberation”.
What used to happen then was that the Tamil organizations stationed sentry groups in close proximity to security force camps. If and when troop movement outside the camps was detected the sentries would alert their respective bases. Immediately armed guerillas would rush to the vicinity and confront the security personnel. Usually the forces would return to camps after a skirmish.
Young Ravishankar who joined the LTTE in Dec 1985 received his baptism of fire as a sentry near the Point Pedro army camp. He was then a part – time guerilla , attending school during daytime and engaging in sentry duty for some hours in the night. According to colleagues he was a brilliant student who abandoned formal studies in 1987 at the age of fifteen.
After doing sentry duty for a while Ravishankar alias Charles was posted as a salesman in a retail shop run by the LTTE known as “niyaaya vilai kadai” or “fair priced store”. During this period Charles received local training in Jaffna.
It was during “Operation Liberation” launched by the armed forces in May 1987 that Charles engaged in formal combat. The bulk of Vadamaratchy division was recaptured by the armed forces.
The LTTE launched a counter strike by attacking the newly set up camp at Nelliaddy Central College on July 5th. Major Kamal led the attack. Charles participated in the attack. The assault was preceded by the LTTE’s first suicide attack. Capt.Miller rammed an explosive laden truck into the camp .
The advent of the Indian Army saw a new conflict arise. The LTTE was at war with the IPKF. Charles remained in Jaffna peninsula engaging in guerilla operations. He was stationed in the Vadamaratchy east sector under the leadership of Capt. Morris.
It was Kili , Pottu Amman’s bodyguard, who first introduced Charles to the intelligence chief. Pottu was impressed and transferred Charles to the Wanni. He received some training in intelligence gathering techniques in the Wanni.
Charles was sent to Colombo in early 1990 with a few other intelligence operatives to establish a clandestine LTTE presence there. This was the time when talks with the Premadasa regime was on. The truce crumbled in June 1990 and war erupted. Charles returned to the North.
There was however a new challenge. Speaking at his former deputy’s funeral in Kilinochchi ,Pottu Amman related details of it. Apparently the LTTE received information about an alleged assassination plot being hatched by former deputy defence minister Ranjan Wijeratne.
Prabakharan’s wife Mathivathani used to worship frequently at the Nallur Kandaswamy temple then.The alleged assassination conspiracy was related to this.
The Joint Operations Command (JOC) was allegedly planning a major offensive immediately after the assassination.The LTTE was angered. It was decided that Colombo should be taught a bitter lesson.
Charles, then only nineteen was entrusted with the task. He moved into Colombo in January 1991 and set two plans of attack in motion. Within a few weeks the LTTE struck in Colombo. The JOC headquarters was blown up. Ranjan Wijeratne was killed by a car bomb.
This was only the beginning. Charles as an “unknown face” of the LTTE remained incognito in Colombo till 1997. What his “cover” in Colombo was then is not known. It is presumed that he made occasional trips to and from the North during this time to obtain first hand instructions and also report back directly.
Though working under Pottu Amman , Charles was mainly instrumental in building up a clandestine LTTE presence in Colombo and some outstation areas. The setting up of safe houses, sleeper cells, moles, hidden storages, along with other tasks like intelligence gathering, ” turning” security personnel, establishing convenient “routes” etc were all functions under his purview.
Charles played a significant role in planning, co-ordinating and executing a series of assassinations in Colombo ranging from former Navy chief Clancy Fernando, Lalith Athulathmudali, Ranasinghe Premadasa, Gamini Dissanayake, Weerasinghe Mallimratchy, GM Premachandra, Damini Wijesekera, Ossie Abeygunasekera etc.
He also had a hand in plotting operations like the attacks on the Kolonnawa oil facility and the Central bank.
When the security authorities became aware of his presence in Colombo , Charles shifted in 1997 to the East. He began directing clandestine operations in the South from places in the Batticaloa and Amparai district.
He worked with senior LTTE east based intelligence officials like Newton, Ramanan, Mano, Nizam, Keerthi, Neelan etc then.
Charles was in Batticaloa – Amparai from 1997 – 2000. During this time he masterminded many operations in Colombo. These included the assassination of people like SLFP cabinet minister CV Gooneratne. TULF national list MP Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam and former Army General Lucky Algama.
The unsuccessful assassination attempt on Chandrika Kumaratunga also had his imprint. This was the time when most LTTE Colombo operations had an Eastern connection.
Though Charles had a great deal of functional autonomy as head of external operations, he was reporting directly to Pottu Amman. Nominally he was Pottu’s seniormost deputy.
But in 2000 Prabakharan and Pottu Amman tasked him with a fresh , daunting challenge.
The objective was to attack the Air Force base in Katunayake and destroy aircraft. This became the sole responsibility of Charles. According to knowledgeable Tamil sources Charles set up an “independent” team for the purpose.
To avoid possible detection and complications , the existing LTTE intelligence machinery was avoided. Instead Charles established a new network while basing himself in Negombo.
On July 24th 2001 the LTTE attacked Katunayake and demolished several Aircraft. 14 tigers were killed. No civilian was harmed. The Kumaratunga regime suffered a masive setback.
This was perhaps the crowning achievement of “Col” Arulvendan.Yet , Pottu Amman while delivering an eulogy observed that Charles had then told him ” Amman, there will be greater triumphs than Katunayake in the future”
The ceasefire between the Ranil Wickremasinghe government and the LTTE in February 2002 saw Charles in “re-play activity”again.”Col” Arulvendan was tasked once again to do what he did best.
Charles was ordered to revive, renew and re-establish an expanded clandestine LTTE network in Colombo, suburbs and outstations.
This included cultivating several Sinhala officers in the armed forces and Police. He had to also eliminate important members of non – LTTE groups and Tamil operatives of the state intelligence network. This despite the ceasefire expressly forbidding such action.
In 2004 he was recalled to the Wanni and made head of military intelligence. This was because Prabakharan had decided by then to commence hostilities in earlu 2005. Charles had to monitor all security installations and gather necessary intelligence. He was also involved in blueprinting action plans.
The Tsunami of Dec 26th 2004 delayed Prabakharan’s design. In the meantime Charles continued with his work as military intelligence head. He also engaged in work for Pottu Amman
When two Britain based Tamils , R. Jeyadevan and A. Vivekanandan were detained by the LTTE in the Wanni over an issue concerning the Eelapatheeswarar hindu temple in London, several tigers had interrogated them. One of them was someone called “Kannan”.
After Charles was killed, Jeyadevan saw his picture in the media and recognized him as “Kannan”. Jeyadevan has gone on record praising Charles for his decent conduct while interrogating him.
As director of military intelligence , Charles was involved in gathering info about the Anuradhapura air base. He was not involved in planning or executing the attack. The attack on naval personnel in Habarana and the assault on the Galle harbour were also the handiwork of Charles.
Sea tiger chief “Col” Soosai recalled with pride that Charles had been responsible for planning the operation and training black sea tigers for the Galle attack. It was the first time that black sea tigers had launched an attack in the deep South.
As is the case in many dangerous persons, Charles was an amiable person with a pleasant disposition. Those who have interacted with him say that he was easy to get along with.
He suffered from migraine and used to take “panadol” regularly. LTTE colleagues referred to him as ” Panadol”.
When the security forces commenced massive operations along the Mannar – Vavuniya border the LTTE found itself under threat. Once again the “special” expertise of Charles was required.
He was placed in charge of a special combat unit that conducted raids of an offensive nature on enemy targets. It was in connection with this new duty that Charles was travelling when he met with death.
[Col. Charles's body was kept at the Cultural Hall for people to pay their last respects-photo: TamilNet]
The LTTE gave him a grand funeral after displaying the body at various places in the Wanni. Almost all the LTTE top brass except the recently injured Prabakharan were there at the final farewell.
Shanmuganathan Ravichandran alias “Col” Arulvendan was buried with LTTE military honours at the Kanagapuram “great heroes abode” in Kilinochchi.
There is no doubt that Charles was a unique though destructive personality. For the LTTE he was a great asset.
As far as the LTTE is concerned no man is indispensable. Yet there are persons who for a long time will be irreplaceable. “Col’ Arulvendan aka Charles was one of them.
The clandestine LTTE presence established by “Col” Arulvendan outside the North – East will remain for a long, long time. The plots conceived by Charles will make their impact in the times to come.
The claymore mine that killed DM Dassanayake at Ja-Ela and the parcel bomb which exploded in Fort on the same day demonstrate that the explosive legacy of Arulvendan/Charles may continue to wreak havoc in the times to come.
January 12th, 2008
by D.B.S.Jeyaraj
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) head of military intelligence Shanmuganathan Ravishankar alias “Col” Arulvendan aka Charles and three of his deputies were killed on January 5th when th vehicle they were travelling in was hit by a claymore mine. The explosion occurred at a spot between Illuppaikkadavai and Pallamadhu along the Mannar – Pooneryn road in the Mannar district.
The LTTE accused the Army’s deep penetration unit as being responsible. The tigers were referring to assassination squads run by the armed forces known officially as Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP). The LRRP referred to as deep penetration units by the LTTE move into tiger controlled territory and ambush top tiger leaders.
The LTTE has frequently charged that LRRP teams were engaged in planting claymore and pressure mines in territory controlled by them. Very often these accusations were made when civilian vehicles were hit by landmines. The official response by Colombo was that of denial.
There was a reason for this. In the first place such unconventional tactics are not usually acknowledged “officially” by any state anywhere in the world. These are “Officially sanctioned unofficial executions”. Also such exercises were expressly forbidden under the Oslo brokered ceasefire act that came into force in February 2002.
When Arulvendan/Charles was killed there was a difference. Media reports stated that the security forces were responsible and glorified the killling as a great success One reason for this was that the Government had abrogated the ceasefire and was not bound by it. The other was that of the victim. being a high profile target. Basking in glory was necessary.
Noted Indian commentator B. Raman had a different take on all this. Here are a few excerpts from his recent article in the Indian media -
“The LTTE’s description of the incident (killing of Charles) as a random attack was meant to convey the impression that the mine, which struck his vehicle, was among those planted by the Sri Lankan Army’s Deep Penetration Unit in the area and was not specifically directed at Charles.
The Sri Lankan Army was initially not aware of the death of Charles. On coming to know of it from the LTTE’s announcement, the Army went to town in order to convey an impression that it had inside information about the likely travel of Charles in the area and had specifically targeted him.
This claim by the Army, meant to create nervousness among the members and supporters of the LTTE, has not been independently corroborated.”
Though attempts are being made to portray the activities of the DPU as being donedirectly y the security forces , this is not true in several instances. While LRRP teams certainly infiltrate tiger territory and ambush LTTE leaders another method is also used frequently.
Wanni residents are paid to lay claymore mines or pressure mines on routes frequented by tiger leaders. The security authorities do not admit to this for their own reasons. Likewise the LTTE does not expose this for different reasons.
Yet it is an open secret that this practice goes on. Recently the LTTE punished a man in Mannar for laying a claymore mine. He was the father of a LTTE “martyr” or great hero. Poverty had compelled him to resort to this. The tigers got suspicious when the man was seen eating regularly at a restaurant.
The killing of Charles has revived interest in the Deep penetration Unit phenomenon again. There have been several instances of senior LTTE leaders being targeted before. There was however a comparative lull where senior tigers escaped or avoided death at the hands of the DPU. The victims in recent times were mainly civilians. But the Charles killing has raised fears of the earlier spectre again.
A prominent LTTE victim of the past was Vaithilingam Sornalingam alias “Colonel” Shankar, the former head of the LTTE’s air wing and military intelligence division. Shankar, killed on September 26 2001 in a claymore device attack in the Oddusuddan area of Mullaithivu district in the northern mainland of the Wanni, was the highest-ranking and most senior Tiger leader to be killed in this manner before Charles.
Earlier, Gangai Amaran, deputy leader of the LTTE’s “Kadal Puli” (Sea Tiger) division, was killed along with his bodyguard in a similar explosion near Akkaraayan Kulam in Kilinochchi district.
In the eastern province, Nizaam, the head of the LTTE’s Batticaloa-Amparai political wing, was killed when the motorcycle he was travelling on was targeted for a claymore device blast at Vaathakalmadhu in Nallathanni Odai, about 36 km southwest of Batticaloa town. The LTTE’s eastern zone communications chief Mano was killed in an incident at Patharaimadam, about 6 km to the west of Valaiiravu in Batticaloa district.
There were three attempts on the life of Ramanan, the LTTE’s intelligence wing leader for Batticaloa and Amparai districts – at Vellaveli, Palugaamam and Karadiyanaaru. Subsequently Ramanan was killed by a sniper at Vavunatheevu.
Other important leaders too have survived assassination attempts in the northern province. Balraj, deputy military commander of the LTTE, escaped miraculously when his vehicle was targeted at Nainamadhu in the Wanni. Likewise, Jeyam, a senior commander, escaped an attempt at Nedunkerni.
The former political wing chief, S.P. Thamilchelvan, was targeted twice. One attempt was made near Iranai Iluppaikulam, where his official vehicle hit a landmine. Thamilchelvan was not in the vehicle. His deputy, travelling in it, survived with injuries.
The other attack was at Kokkavil in Kilinochchi when Thamilchelvan was on his way to meet a Norwegian peace delegation at Mallavi. A landmine exploded killing a bodyguard who travelled in a vehicle that followed the Tiger leader.
Thamilchelvan was killed on November 2nd last year in an aerial attack. The man who escaped the DPU twice was killed by a bomb while sleeping in a bunker at Kilinochchi.
This campaign of ambushes when it began reportedly angered LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabakaran and understandably, caused consternation among LTTE cadres . A virtual state of emergency was declared in the LTTE regions of the Wanni.
“Colonel” Balraj, the LTTE’s deputy military commander and second in command to Prabakaran in military matters, was appointed a special commander for the Wanni region and entrusted with a special task and powers by the LTTE supremo.
According to informed sources, Balraj’s immediate goal was to halt the attacks on LTTE leaders and apprehend those responsible for them.
In its press releases, the LTTE then accused a “deep penetration commando unit of the Sri Lankan Army” of being responsible for Shankar’s killing and the other incidents. Pro-LTTE Tamil journals published abroad stated that the attacks were perpetrated by small teams of special force commandos trained by a Western power.
Such squads are said to infiltrate, through the jungle terrain of the Wanni, into LTTE-controlled zones and carry out the attacks these reports alleged.. They were supposed to lie in wait with remote controls, trigger the devices at appropriate moments and leave the area immediately.
It was also suspected then that some Tamils living in LTTE-controlled areas were collaborating with the Sri Lankan armed forces. They were suspected of providing intelligence, information, supplies and even safe houses for the assailants.
These alleged collaborators were suspected to be undisclosed members or former members of the various non-LTTE Tamil militant groups, now living as civilians in the Wanni.
Another theory was that the suspects were persons sympathetic to former LTTE deputy leader Mahathaya, who was executed for allegedly conspiring against Prabakaran. The possibility of ordinary people acting as mercenaries was also not ruled out. Tamil militants associated with the Army as “paramilitary personnel” were also suspected of being responsible for the attacks.
Interestingly, while the LTTE officially blamed a “deep penetration team”, the Tigers in the eastern region took punitive action against Tamil civilians then. Vinayagamoorthy Muraleetharan alias “Col” Karuna was the Eastern regional commander then.
. In the eastern region, the LTTE controlled the hinterland to the west of the Batticaloa lagoon, known as Paduvaan- karai (the shore of the setting sun) while the government controlled the littoral regions to the east of the lagoon, known as Eluvaankarai (the shore of the rising sun).
Initially, there were five crossing points across the lagoon for people commuting between the regions. The Tigers then closed down three of them, in order to facilitate a greater and more intensive scrutiny of “infiltrators” and check whether explosive devices are smuggled in.
In the eastern region, the LTTE also undertook a massive search-and-arrest operation. Several persons were detained and interrogated. The LTTE claimed that 37 explosive devices, concealed in vantage points and stored in safehouses, were discovered following the investigation.
At least five Tamil civilians were executed for their alleged involvement in the assassination campaign. Two of the executions were gruesome. The victims, who were first forced to make a public confession, were compelled to kill themselves using the explosives they were accused of possessing. It was alleged that these persons had betrayed the Tamil cause for financial remuneration offered by the government.
The situation in the East has been dramatically transformed now . The security forces have driven the LTTE away and taken full control of the province. The tigers were weakened further by the Karuna revolt and split.
However, the LTTE’s approach towards the DPU in the northern region was different to that of the Eastern region then. It suspected that the deep-penetration teams originated from the Manal Aaru or Weli Oya military complex, situated in a strategic location interdicting the territorial contiguity of the Tamil-dominated northern and Tamil-majority eastern provinces.
In an attempt to prevent or at least contain suspected infiltration, the Tigers established a tight security cordon around the forward defence lines of the Weli Oya complex.
The LTTE also intensified “border” security along the southern line of control, between Vidathaltheevu in the western Mannar district and Kumulamunai in the eastern Mullaithivu district. The civilian militia, known as “ellaippadai” or border force, was involved, along with regular cadres, in such operations.
However, the demarcation line is almost 190 km long and consists of several jungle tracts that are quite porous. If the LTTE was to seal off this border effectively, it had to redeploy a substantial number of fighters from its strategically important northern front along the Kilaly-Eluthumadduvaal-Nagar Kovil axis. There was a severe logistical dilemma .
According to Tamil residents of the Wanni , the LTTE starts a systematic “search, detain and interrogate” campaign when DPU attacks occur.. Regular fighters and members of the LTTE’s police force and intelligence wings are engaged in this. The LTTE’s “Leopards” commando unit and civilian militia cadres comb the jungles to flush out any deep-penetration squads trekking there.
A SIGNIFICANT feature of the DPU ambushes in the past was that the targets in all cases were senior and important leaders of the LTTE. In view of this fact, the leaders were asked to take certain precautions. For instance, senior LTTE figures, who travel in jeeps or are accompanied by back-up vehicles with bodyguards or travel in convoys, were asked to avoid such practices.
The Tigers have usually used minor, interior roads more often than major open roads used by civilians. Almost all the assassinations and assassination attempts occurred on these roads earlier. Later the LTTE began using the main roads.
This situation changed and until the killing of Charles senior LTTE leaders were not killed in DPU attacks for a long time. The victims were usually civilians.
When the Sri Lankan forces began this ambush campaign some years ago they were not publicising it.That situation was fraught with irony. The Sri Lankan armed forces had faced a lot of negative publicity for various “failures” in its operations against the LTTE then . Now they were supposedly engaged in an effective campaign affecting the LTTE.
The Tigers’ territorial impregnability was being assailed, their chief leaders were being targeted, and the cadres were being demoralised. Although the LTTE blamed the armed forces publicly, those responsible for the campaign were unable to take credit for it.
This was because of both the confidential nature of the exercise and the reluctance in official circles to admit that an assassination campaign was being conducted.
The LTTE however was under severe threat from such operations. The LTTE’s inability to prevent or even reduce the extent of the threat, and also the fact that none of the alleged perpetrators were caught, has been damaging. . Another problem for the LTTE was the need to deplete other fronts to deploy additional personnel necessary to seal its borders completely. Intensive searches, detentions and interrogation of members of the public in a bid to weed out suspected collaborators alienated the population living in areas under its control.
The situation was ironical because the predators had become the prey.
Past decades saw Tiger operatives killing a number of persons regarded as enemies of the organisation in various parts of the island. The LTTE was able to choose the time, the place and the targets for operations of this type, and execute them meticulously. The Sri Lankan authorities were unable to prevent such attacks or bring to book their perpetrators.
But the tables were turned on the Tigers when the DPU or LRRP began operations.. A pattern emerged , where several senior LTTE activists were targeted in a systematic fashion in Tiger-controlled regions.
The series of limited offensives in the North have changed the situation. The enemy is at the gate from a tiger perspective. The emphasis is on conducting a defensive war aimed at keeping troops from entering tiger territory en masse. The need to prevent DPU infiltration diminished. The killing of Charles shows that the problem has not gone away.
January 12th, 2008