Archive for May 13th, 2008

Basil is the Sun around which The Eastern P.C. will revolve

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

The controversial election to the Eastern Provincial Council is over but the controversy over the chief minister (CM)appointment is not over.

Speculation whether the new CM will be Pillaiyan, M.L.A.M. Hizbullah or some other is somewhat absurd because in a sense the issue really does not matter.

Regardless of who becomes de jure Eastern chief minister the de facto chief minister will be none other than national list MP Basil Rajapakse.

[Basil Rajapakse]

The Presidential sibling who calls the shots in matters concerning the East will be the unofficial Viceroy of the province.

The result of the first ever election to the Eastern provincial council was a foregone conclusion even before the poll was held.

There was no way that the Rajapakse regime would lose it. The Government had to win it whatever the cost.

If a Government victory was a “known” the only two “unknowns” were firstly the methods to be used by the Government and secondly the final figures of voting.

How will the verdict be engineered?
What will it be?

[M.L.A. M. Hizbullah]

The Government contesting under the betel symbol as the United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA)got 308, 886 votes and 18 seats. It also got two bonus seats thus making it’s overall tally 20 out of a 37 member council.

The Chief opposition United National Party (UNP) obtained 250,232 entitling it to fifteen seats. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) got 9,390 votes and one seat. The Tamil Democratic National Alliance (TDNA) with 7,714 votes got one seat.

The district break down was as follows. Amparai district that has fourteen seats saw the UPFA with 144, 247 getting eight and the UNP with 121,272 obtaining six..

Batticaloa district with eleven seats saw the UPFA getting six with 105,341 votes and the UNP getting four with 58,602 votes. The TDNA consisting of the EPRLF (Naba), PLOTE and TULF got one seat.

Trincomalee with ten seats saw the UNP with 70, 858 votes getting five seats and the UPFA with 59,298 votes obtaining four. The JVP also got a seat in Trinco district.

Apart from the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) other parties contesting as part of the UPFA were the break-away tiger faction known as the Tamil Makkal Viduthalaip Puligal (TMVP), the National Unity Alliance (NUA), The All Ceylon Muslim Congress (ACMC) and the National Congress.

The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress contested in all districts under the UNP elephant symbol.

Both the UPFA and UNP fielded multi-ethnic candidates. These lists reflected the multi – ethnic demography of the Eastern province.

[Pillaiyan, a candidate for the post of Chief Minister for Eastern provincial council is seen in his office in Batticaloa, via Yahoo! AP Photo/Gemunu Amarasinghe]

This however did not remove the “communalism” factor. Ethnicity and region played an important role both overt and covert in the hustings.

The stakes in terms of real politik were immense for the Rajapakse regime. The 75% Tamil speaking “kizhakku” province officially referred to in Sinhala as “nagena hira” is the jewel in this government’s military conquest crown.

This government has derived much political mileage out of the fact that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organization was driven out of the east and that the province has been liberated from tiger clutches.

The logical follow-up to this conquest was to rehabilitate, re-construct and develop the province.

Making a showpiece out of the liberated east is a pre-requisite in demonstrating that the province is well under Government control and that the people appreciate the fact.

Colombo also requires much international assistance and financial investment to re-construct and develop the East.

Some countries including India have expressed willingness to provide such aid.

One condition however was that the East should have its own provincial administration. The development should be initiated and co-ordinated regionally and not from Colombo it was emphasised.

This necessitated the setting up of either an interim advisory council or re-activating an elected provincial council.

The Rajapakse regime opted for polls due to a number of reasons.

Chief among them was the desire to concretise the de-merger and “Sinhalaise” the province.

The Rajapakse regime deeply infuenced by the Sinhala supremacists has been blatantly open about its eastern agenda.

One of its objectives was to de-link the Tamil dominated Northern Province and Tamil majority eastern province.

Both had been “temporarily” merged in terms of the Indo-Lanka accord of July 29th 1987.

When the Supreme Court ruled that the merger was invalid due to procedural flaws the Government always had the option of re-merging it through appropriate action.

There was also the option of letting the status quo prevail till a better alternative was found.

Instead the government went ahead with the de-merging process.The government wanted to ensure that the de-merged east remains permanently separate.

Effective de- linking was necessary to usher in “Sinhalaisation” of the east. So retired military officials and experienced administrators subscribing to the “sinhalaisation” agenda were given key appointments.

What then is the not so hidden “Sinhalaisation” agenda of the Rajapakse regime?

This writer has referred to it in these columns on previous occasions. Nevertheless it is important to note the contours of this project at this juncture.

An earlier politico – military objective of previous regimes was to interdict the territorial contiguity of the Northern and Eastern provinces/.The creation of the Weli – Oya/Manal aaru region consisting of areas from the Mullaitheevu, Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Anuradhapura districts was the chief component of this strategy.

This Government however has expanded and enlarged this strategy. If a new district is to be created out of Weli-Oya/ Manal Aaru a Constitutional amendment is required. The regime does not have two-thirds majority in Parliament for such an amendment.

But then this Government is resolved to go beyond the confines of a mere district. Instead of creating a new district to interdict contiguity of both provinces the Rajapakse regime is determined to alter the demographic structure of an entire province.

At the turn of the twentieth century 55% of the East was Tamil, 40 % Muslim and 4 % Sinhala. Thanks mainly to state-aided colonisation schemes the population ratio at the turn of the twenty-first century was 38 % Tamil, 36 % Muslim and 26 % Sinhala.

The idea now is to alter this ration further. The Sinhala population is to be increased in the Trincomalee and Amparai districts so that within a few years the single largest ethnicity in both districts would be Sinhala.

Currently the Muslims are the largest ethnicity in both districts but no single ethnicity is a clear majority. If the Sinhalaisation agenda gets underway the Sinhala community will be more than 50 % in both districts. The Tamils and Muslims will be a minority.

The Batticaloa district will remain a Tamil majority district but there will be an enhanced Sinhala presence. The Kudumbimalai/Thoppigala region along with areas like Thirukonamadhu and Vaaganeri will be Sinhalaised. Eventually the Sinhala community will be the second largest ethnicity in Batticaloa district.

Thus the “Sinhalaisation” agenda will ensure that the single largest ethnicity in the East would be the Sinhalese. Given the current ethnic ratio where the Sinhala people are only one – fourths of the province such a possibility may seem remote.

But the demographic ratio can be altered rapidly and drastically if and when the Sinhalaisation agenda is implemented with vigorous gusto. In that case the goal may be reached by 2015.At the latest 2025

Already hard line Sinhala Buddhist organizations have compiled lists of people willing to re-locate to the East if and when the correct conditions are created.

The process will be expedited when the re-construction and development projects are underway and the total security of the east is guaranteed.

The induction of new Sinhala settlers from the South into the eastern province will rely mainly on an “encroachment approach”.

Already an extensive road and highway network is being constructed and developed in Trincomalee district.

Thereafter Sinhala settlers will be brought in as “officially sanctioned unofficial encroachers” and settled with the help of the military.

After a short period their encroachments will be legalised through both the Provincial and central administration.

Similarly as and when development projects get started much of the labour would be brought in from outside though local Muslim and Tamil residents will also get some jobs for cosmetic reasons.

For this “sinhalaisation” agenda to succeed militarisation is necessary. This has been done to a great extent after the LTTE was driven out.

Recruiting Sinhala youths into the armed forces or auxiliary forces is also being done.

The setting up of a provincial council controlled by the regime would help the military consolidate its hold on the province.

Though there woud be a nominal civil administration the security forces will wield real power. The elected administration will simply toe the line.

But for the strategy to succeed in the long term ,extensive investment and development projects are needed.

Only then can the economy be sustained and new influx of people accomodated. It is here that an elected provincial administration is very necessary.

Portraying the Provincial council as a harbinger of change and engine of economic growth ,foreign investment, aid and assistance will be procured. India is expected to provide much help to develop the east .

A key component of this development strategy will be agriculture and tourism. The extensive lands in the East will be handed over to International agro – business concerns.

A pliable provincial council would be helpful in this land alienation.

Apart from these issues the holding of an eastern provincial poll also ensures that the de – merger stays in place.

If the provinces are to be re – merged the Eastern provincial council must first pass a resolution. Thereafter the President may hold a referendum if deemed necessary.

A govt controlled Council will not support a merger conditional or otherwise. In fact it may pass a resolution welcoming the de-merger.

There is also the need to demonstrate the Government’s success in winning the war against “terror”.

Enthroning the LTTE break-away faction TMVP in the provincial administration can be cited as proof that the eastern Tamil people are firmly behind the Government.

Against this backdrop it was imperative from the government’s perspective that the UPFA should win the Eastern PC. Whatever the cost it had to be done.

There was no alternative and there was no way in which the opposition would have been allowed to win.

Realising that a government victory was a foregone conclusion this column virtually ignored the eastern polls in the past.

This column did not go through the motions of analysing or speculating about the electoral campaign.

While it was certain that the Government would win the uncertain aspects were the methodolgy to be used and the margin of victory.

The architecht of the UPFA victory was Basil Rajapakse. He is the master puppeteer who pulled all the puppet strings in this mock show.

Initially the Government wanted to conduct a free and fair election.The polls required political credibility both nationally and internationally. So the government was keen on a flaw – free poll.

Basil devised an incredible campaign strategy.

Many of us have heard or read the story about the boatman who had to ferry a tiger, goat and a cabbage in his boat.

He could only take two at a time across the water. If left alone together, the tiger would have killed the goat or the goat would have devoured the cabbage. So the boatman did more than one trip to ferry them across.

In this case Basil brought within UPFA folds the Sinhala Buddhist extremist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) the Pillaiyan led TMVP and various Muslim parties. They all had different and competing interests.

Unlike the boatman in the fable “Apey” Basil adopted a different tactic. He promised the chief minister post to both the Muslims and the Tamils if either side got the most number of votes.

It was like the boatman in the story telling the tiger and goat they would get to devour what they wanted if they helped get the boat across.

Basil Rajapakse’s campaign strategy may have worked well if not for the Muslim Congress.

Since the pro – LTTE Tamil National Alliance had been intimidated to the extent of keeping out of the polls the “Tamil” field was clear for the Government.

The TMVP, EPDP, TDNA, EDF etc were all Tamil parties either with the government or pro – government.

The TMVP was relied upon on to terrify voters through subtle and indirect means. Also ethnic differences with Muslims were to be exploited. Stationing TMVP members at each Police post was a deliberate move to frighten Tamils.

The TMVP also engaged in psychological warfare to terrify the Tamil people.

Basil enticed Muslim leaders like Hizbullah in “B’caloa district, Azeez in Amparai district and “thideer” Thowfeek in Trincomalee district from SLMC to UPFA ranks. They were made candidates.

The personal influence of people like Athaullah, Ferial Ashraff, Ameer Ali, Najeeb Abdul Majeed, etc along with that of the Respective Muslim candidates was expected to sway the Muslim vote.

The Government was very confident about the Sinhala vote. The development work done in Trincomalee and the integration of Sinhala civilians into the military effort was enought to attract the bulk of Sinhala votes in that district.

In Amparai former UNP strongman P. Dayaratne was with the government now. Itt was felt that the party with its lackluster leadership would not be able to galvanize enough votes.

As for the Tamils and Muslims the strategy was quite cynical. A multi – ethnic list if handled correctly could have helped promote inter-ethnic amity. But here it was different.

By promising the Tamils and Muslims the chief minister post much ethnic enmity and competition was promoted. It was a divisive and not a unifying approach.

The UPFA may have won the election without resorting to fraudulent means but for three or four factors.

Firstly the Muslim Congress and UNP were able to strike a deal and the SLMC took the bold step of contesting under the elephant and not its own tree symbol.

Secondly the unexpected twist of SLMC stalwarts Rauff Hakeem, Basheer Segu Dawood and Hasan Ali resigning their Parliamentary seats and contesting in the Trinco, B’caloa and Amparai districts respectively, electrified the Muslim masses. The opposition charge about the SLMC abandoning the tree symbol did not make an effective impact

Thirdly there was the welcome sign of many Tamils being ready to defy the dictates of the TMVP and avoid being lured by Government promises. Many Tamils stayed away and also spoiled their votes. But many were prepared to vote against the government and did vote for the UNP.

Fourthly some Tamils if not all were ready to sink their ethnic differences and vote for Muslim candidates in the UNP. This was visible particularly in the case of Hakeem and to a lesser extent with Basheer.

In such a situation intelligence reports procured by the Government indicated that the UNP would edge out the UPFA if a free poll was held.

The UNP would come second in getting Sinhala votes but would get more Muslim and come close in getting substantial Tamil votes it was reported.

Thus the Government had to resort to other means to win. Muslim gangs were brought from Puttalam to “facilitate” electoral work in the east.The TMVP also engaged in its own tactics. But due to the spotlight being on the TMVP and the over confidence that the fear factor had terrorised Tamils the ex-tigers could not engage in large scale rigging.

Sections of the Police and even armed forces “helped” the UPFA on election day.

Thus the UNP-SLMC combine came second in getting Sinhala and Tamil votes but was ahead in getting more Muslim votes.

The SLMC and UNP have protested strongly about electoral malpractices and alleged that the election was not free and fair. More details of the fraudulent methods used will come to light in the coming weeks.

There is much truth in these complaints and allegations. The eastern provincial council poll was a flawed one. Statements endorsing the fairness of the poll by partisan election monitors lack credibility in this respect.

The silver lining in this dark cloud scenario is the Trincomalee, Muthur and Kalmunai electoral division results. Trincomalee town and environs, Kinniya, Kalmunai and Saithamaruthu etc have been places where a substantial number of votes were cast for the UNP.

In such areas of groundswell votes the scope for vote rigging has been less.The vote tampering was more in the rural regions and also places where the competition was close and intense.

Despite fervent efforts by the UPFA to “garner” votes through unorthodox methods the UNP-SLMC combine won Trincomalee district.

This shows that whtever the pressure tactics an overwhelming expression of public opinion can defeat authoritarianism and tyranny.

Now the speculation is about who the chief minister will be. Is it Hizbullah or Pillaiyan? The chances are that Pillaiyan may be CM for 2 years and then a Muslim would be appointed on a rotational basis. It could be the other way about too.

Pillaiyan’s prospects are brighter not because he is a Tamil but because he could be a greater puppet than Hizbullah.

It is tragi-comic to see both Pillaiyan and Hizbullah claiming that their respective communities have brought in more votes for the government.

In short the Tamil and Muslim puppets are proudly boasting about having served their Sinhala master puppeteer better.

It does not matter whether Pillaiyan or Hizbullah or someone else becomes eastern chief minister.Real power will be in Basil Rajapakse’s hands.

There will be de-jure Chief ministers but the de-facto CM will be Basil Rajapakse. The President’s brother would be like the viceroy of the east.

Pillaiyan or Hizbullah, Basil is the sun around which the eastern provincial council will revolve in the future.

There may be many projects in the pipeline and the gravy train could indeed be long The moolah to be made will be more than ten percent.

DBS Jeyaraj can be reached on djeyaraj2005@yahoo.com

May 13th, 2008

Sinking of A 520/MV Invincible in Trincomalee

by Commodore RS Vasan IN (Retd)

Reports indicate that a SLN logistic support ship was sunk at about 0223 hrs on Saturday 09 May 2008. The ship was next to Ashroff Jetty at Trincomalee and was being loaded with explosives to be carried to KKS. This ship itself came in to the possession of the SL Navy by a court order way back in 2003 when it was apprehended transporting illegal migrants in Southern Sri Lanka. The ship was more than 38 years old and was regularly used for logistic support for the Sri Lankan armed forces. Ironically the earlier name of the ship ?Invincible? did nothing to prevent the ship from meekly submitting to the designs of the black tigers.

Before coming to a conclusion on what would have caused the sinking it would be in order to examine the methods/options, which could be adopted for launching of such attacks. There are many options as far as underwater attacks are concerned.

The First is an attack by a suicide diver strapped with explosives who could approach the target underwater with out being detected, cling on to any vulnerable portion of the ship and detonate the explosives .The results of an underwater explosion on the hull are always a devastating one and invariably results in breaking up of the ship and subsequent sinking. In this case some reports have indicated that the ship sank with in 13 minutes of the attack. Apparently there was no loss of lives.

The Second method is to attach a limpet mine to the underwater hull of the ship and this could be set to explode either with a timing device or with a fuzing device that could activate with sound or pressure or movement in its vicinity. In such cases the diver could get away from the scene of action. However during the process of his retreat from the ship if he is detected, the success of the operation would be compromised and would lead to bottom searches of the target ship and neutralization of the limpet mine. The black tigers would not have liked any compromise and thus would have preferred the suicide option.

Related aspects of carrying out such attacks have been discussed in an analysis of the sinking of a Fast Attack Craft on 22nd March 2008 vide.

The depths off Trinco and even alongside berths are very much favourable for such attacks. I can vouch for this fact from my first hand experience in the harbour from where I operated for some time during the early 90s.The fact that the ship was stationery and the crew perhaps busy with the loading operations may have contributed to not detecting the diver and the resultant success of this operation by the Commandos of the LTTE.

The Third option is for the human torpedoes to be used against the target. The SL Navy officials have apparently has ruled this out. From the point of view of the Sea Tigers, the suicide attack would indeed have been the choice of execution against heavily defended targets.

The pattern of operations suggests that the tactic adopted is similar to the one that was followed during the sinking of a fast attack aircraft on 22nd Mar 2008 except that in the former case, the FAC was moving at sea and in the latter case the target was stationery in a protected harbour.

Having examined all the three options, based on the facts and reports available so far, it can be inferred that the underwater defence systems in place were breached by a suicide diver who succeeded in detonating explosives next to the old underwater hull of the ship MV A 520 resulting in the sinking of the logistic support vessel

Comments on the preparedness of SL Navy

It appears that the established precautions for thwarting an underwater attack were either not in place or failed to prevent the impending attack. The standard practice for preventing underwater attacks by divers is to have boat patrols and drop random scare charges to deter the divers. Divers also search the bottom of the ships at regular intervals to spot any explosive that may have been attached. The shipside is rigged with lights for ready use and upper deck sentries are posted to spot any activity that may raise suspicion of the presence of saboteurs.

Most Navies adopt a calibrated degree of preparedness to ensure that the threat is tackled in a timely and efficient manner by denying the use of the waters to saboteurs in a protected harbour. Many navies also use their sonars to cause damage to the eardrums, impair hearing and deter the diver by use of high underwater sound power. Such measures depend on the threat perception and the degree of alertness assumed in a particular location. In addition it is also a practice to have grapnels towed behind the patrolling boat (similar to trawling operations) to cause injury to the saboteurs. Whether all these measures were in place is not known.

Sri Lankan Navy has been credited with the sinking of more than a dozen logistic ships of the LTTE, which were employed for carrying the essentials from many parts of the Indian Ocean for sustaining the war effort. The ship that was sunk was apparently also used in the operations against three logistic ships of the Sea Tigers off Coco Island in 2007.

This is the second such sinking in the last two months. While the names of the three suicide attackers were given out soon after the attack on the Fast Attack Craft two months ago, all that has been mentioned in this case by the Tamil net is that the Commandos from Kangkai Amaran unit of the Sea tigers executed the attack. This unit apparently was named after a Senior Commander of the Sea Tigers who was killed in Mannar District in an attack by the Deep Penetration Unit of the Sri Lankan Navy in Jun 2001.

In conclusion, it is clear that that the Sea tigers still have the capability to surprise the SL Navy and would like to regain the control of the seas which is so essential for the tigers to replenish from many parts of the world including southern India.

The use of underwater divers for attack while not being novel has the potential to cause serious damages, loss of morale amongst the forces and disrupt planned activities at sea. The success of such operations would have deleterious impact on the ongoing operations of Sri Lankan forces, which are trying to move supplies and military hardware through the eastern sea routes to KKS. One can safely assume that more such attacks and all the options discussed above would be exercised by the Sea Tigers to wrest the initiative from the Sri Lankan Navy, which has enjoyed some successes in the recent months. [southasiaanalysisgroup]

(The author with distinguished naval and coast guard service for over 34 years is presently with Observer Research Foundation and is steering the Maritime Security Programme under the aegis of International Security Studies (ISS), headed by General VP Malik former Army Chief The views expressed are his own)

May 13th, 2008


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