I. Former anti-LTTE militant entities who became political parties (i.e., Eelam Peoples Democratic Party). They had always supported the war against the LTTE as it related to their survival. They also had been reminding now and then about the unfinished devolution agenda of Tamil minorities. They actively participated in Rajapaksa’s war against the LTTE and would strongly oppose its entry into politics. They are pragmatists who understand the limitations of Indian support and have depended more upon the ruling party in Sri Lanka. Their stars will be on the rise in the coming years and President Rajapaksa is likely to increasingly use them to ensure the LTTE does not stage a comeback under the cloak of democracy.

II. The Tamil National Alliance, a collection of splintered Tamil parties, who had accepted Prabhakaran’s leadership. They won handsomely in the last parliamentary elections with the LTTE’s benevolent support. They have abundant political talent that was never put to good use for fear of offending Thalaivar Prabhakaran. The government and the people of Sri Lanka generally view them as the political front of LTTE. To some extent this is true; though TNA members were always eloquent on propagating the Tamil cause within the parliament, they neither took any political initiative on their own nor could influence LTTE policies (i.e., boycott of presidential poll) that affected the future of Tamils. Though they criticise India often for not baling out Tamils from their problems, they keep their old links in India alive. After the elimination of LTTE as a power centre their credibility and influence in India is as suspect as it is in Sri Lanka. Their influence on politics will probably be minimal in the coming years and different component party leaders are likely to find ways to survive on their own. Some of their supporters might return to their parent party from which they broke away over the issue of support to the LTTE.

III. Then there are former LTTE cadres like the Batticaloa LTTE leader Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, now an MP, minister and vice president of the SLFP) and Pillaiyan (Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, chief minister of Eastern Provincial Council) who have stood by President Rajapaksa during the war. Former LTTE cadres, cleared after screening, are likely to gravitate to them in the coming months. They can form a strong political base for Karuna and Pillaiyan, though there might be a scramble between the two on this count. As easterners both the leaders have some limitations in motivating them.

There are two national developments that could affect the future of Tamil politics. All political parties have been split in their support to President Rajapaksa. And the military victory is edging out the opposition from their legitimate political space. Much would depend upon how Tamil leaders these two politically turbulent issues.

Though LTTE would never be allowed to contest as a political party, pro-LTTE sections of the public particularly in the north could be an important factor to swing election results. Similarly, at least some element of Tamil expatriates who had supported the LTTE are also likely to be roped in to support political activity in the coming months. The proposed local body elections in the north would perhaps act as a barometer to indicate the effect of these pulls and pressures.

India-Tamil Nadu-Sri Lanka triangular relations

The strong support for the Congress led coalition in the recent general elections in India is likely to be used to vindicate India’s ambivalent Sri Lanka policy. The success of the Congress - Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) combine only reinforces the assessment that the Sri Lanka Tamil issue is not a “vote-catching” issue in Tamil Nadu, despite widespread sympathy for their plight. So by and large Indian policy is likely to continue to be reactive rather than proactive.

Given this setting, India-Sri Lanka relations are likely to improve. President Rajapaksa is likely to play the China card effectively to garner maximum advantage. And this might be reflected in favourable trade and investment policies towards Sri Lanka.

However, the Tamil Nadu assembly elections will be due in two years. The DMK, if it goes under new leadership to contest the polls, will have a tough time to regain its mandate. And the failure of India’s Sri Lanka policy could be resurrected once again as an election issue. So the DMK will continue to maintain pressure on Sri Lanka on the twin issues of devolution and rehabilitation of Tamil population in Sri Lanka. So India is likely to press for speedy implementation of the 13th amendment (the only tangible thing at present) and provide large scale support for the rehabilitation kitty.

On the strategic security front, increased Chinese and Pakistani influence will continue to be a matter of concern for India. However, India appears to have taken it in the stride as part of the growing reach of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region. Ideally, India should up the development of Trincomalee port as a counterpoise to Hambantota where China is building a port complex. However, India might drag its feet on this issue and probably wait to gauge the impact of possible Sino-US economic convergence on South Asian security.

International perspectives

During the course of the war, Sri Lanka has demonstrated the limitations of international influence in its decision making process. President Rajapaksa has cleverly used the inherent differences among the permanent members of the UN Security Council to deflect criticism of Sri Lanka for its poor human rights and humanitarian record. Sri Lanka’s crude handling of the dissenting media at home, restrictions on NGOs, and delaying of visas for entry of foreign media men and NGOs, have kindled the ire of international community (i.e., EU and the US) by the casual way Sri Lanka treated their objections on human rights and human rights issues. Western nations have strong human rights lobbies and some of them like Britain and Canada have in addition large Sri Lanka Tamil expatriate and immigrant population.

President Rajapaksa managed to ward off a Western effort to condemn Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Council for its gross humanitarian violations during the war, when it met in Geneva on April 26. On the contrary, he managed with the help of India, China, Pakistan, Russia, Cuba and other countries, to get the majority votes in the UNHRC to pass Sri Lanka’s resolution congratulating the country for defeating terrorism. Emboldened by this success, Sri Lanka is likely to harden its stand on allowing international watchdogs to probe its human rights record.

It could work against Sri Lanka’s interests as human rights lobbies in the EU and the US are working for strong action, including economic sanctions, against the country. This could affect the renewal of the EU’s duty free GSP plus tariff concessions extended to Sri Lanka (already on one year extension), as well as delay the approval of IMF loan of $1.9 billion dollars.

Despite economic aid from China, India and Iran, SriLanka will need large scale economic assistance to get back on its feet as the war has rendered large populations unproductive and inflation had been galloping. So we can expect the country to come to terms with the West, particularly the US, to find some face saving method on the human rights question. Ultimately President Rajapaksa is likely to implement the 13th amendment to satisfy international community including India to improve Sri Lanka’s international image.

Sri Lanka-UK relations have been strained for sometime for a number of reasons. The UK has a large Tamil expatriate population and politically it would like to soft pedal the Sri Lanka objections over questionable anti Sri Lanka activity of the expatriates. This had been the major source of irritation for Sri Lanka. The kid glove treatment of the massive anti-Sri Lanka demonstrations of expatriate population taken over by LTTE acolytes are case in point. Given its complexity, it is doubtful whether the relations between the two countries would mend in the near future.

Future portends

A few trends are emerging in the aftermath of the war that could affect Sri Lanka’s future. Their impact would depend upon how the President handles these issues to take the country forward.

I. Rise of monolithic power: With the opposition weakened as never before, the rise of monolithic power with its attendant weaknesses of lack of accountability, absence of rule of law, increase in bureaucratic power and crushing of dissent are likely to stay for sometime. Coupled with the heady mixture of Sinhala chauvinism it could become an explosive mixture for ethnic amity.

II. Military as a power centre: As discussed earlier, rise of militarism and emergence of military as a power centre is a distinct possibility. With a large army continuing to control a major chunk of minority population, minorities will continue to feel insecure. This will be detrimental to restoring normal life in the war affected areas.

III. Dissipation of Tamil influence: In the absence of a strong united Tamil lobby to parley with the government, the Tamils might have to be satisfied with what the President offers as devolution package, as and when he chooses to do so. Inevitably, it is likely to be tied to the next parliamentary poll.

IV. Indian influence: India is likely to play a progressively diminishing role in Sri Lanka politics. However, its economic footprint will probably enlarge.

V. Strategic implications for the region: The LTTE might find it difficult to re-emerge as a powerful force in Sri Lanka. This will strengthen Sri Lanka’s ability to handle its internal problems better. At the same time Sri Lanka is likely to be courted by the major powers – China, and the US - for stabilising their strategic influence in the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lanka has a far more important place in India’s overall strategic security map than the two major powers. So development of strategic relations between India and Sri Lanka is going to become a crucial issue.