Rajapaksa or Fonseka on losing have to contest the General Elections. For Rajapaksa the nomination date would have to be tailored for him to contest, to keep his party afloat. For Fonseka it will be for his survival. It is a more onerous assignment for Fonseka being without a credible political party. A solitary swan cannot make an impact among a herd of elephants experienced in the law of the jungle. Fonseka is bound to find Wickremesinghe less congenial than Rajapaksa who made the water sufficiently sweet for a thirsty man.

Fonseka is unlikely to be servile to a man who has faced more defeats in the political arena than victories he won on the battlefield. Both will calibrate their futuristic plans for 2016; If Fonseka loses narrowly he will emerge as the strongest candidate at the next outing in 2016 from the opposition, denting hopes of all UNP aspirants and will search for a political party where he is treated with awe notwithstanding defeat. If he loses badly he can blame himself and search for his green card. If the General wins, 2016 may have to be re written.

There is a party in waiting in the JVP with a vacancy in leadership. JVP will gladly accommodate Fonseka symbolically for the front desk and the JVP would forsake the bell for the swan to get UNP on board to extract votes at a general election; otherwise the 43 seats gained on the last outing will be reduced to a negligible number. Fonseka cemented the UNP and JVP on a common platform against a Rajapaksa regime but the ideological and cultural differences are too sprawling for the trinity to survive for long. JVPs' survival is dependant on links with Fonseka. Anchoring Fonseka was triumph for the JVP - at least they get coverage on borrowed time.

The Sunday Leader revelations followed with the Philip Alston epistle were a double dose of unpalatable medicine to Fonseka as it collided with the ethos of the educated patriotic urban voters expected to pile the votes for him against corruption and family domination. Fonseka by his follies converted those preparing to swing to him to look at him as unsuitable presidential material and probably destroyed the opportunities of future independent candidates emerging for all times - a perennial JVP gimmick for covering the vacuum existing within their ranks.

Philip Alston has unintentionally done a favour for Rajapaksa. Foreign interference binds the locals more with those defending the nation than those prompting incursions. Rajapaksa has merely to defend the country and its army from the plight Fonseka has placed it in. It also helps Wickremesinghe's image as many within the party would be cautious of Fonseka with his swaggering outlook and leave him for the JVP to handle as their private property. Fonseka sounded strong on corruption but his blundering conduct makes Wickremesinghe look brighter for the future.

Would the UNP require a devalued JVP unlike the SLFP that acquired a JVP that was a force to be reckoned with? Would Fonseka be prepared to move to the UNP and be a lieutenant to Wickremesinghe shadowing the Defence Ministry? The Generals options are minimal, without UNP assistance he is a disabled soldier.

The UNP can present a single slate with the JVP for a General Election on the back of a swan because the UNP solid vote will never float in the direction of the JVP unlike the UPFA vote. But it could make their voters stay at home. Growth of the JVP would shrink further as it would lose its strong ideological base in flirting with the UNP. Taking on board JVP, will cramp the style of the UNP, but if Fonseka hitches a ride it will be a gruesome threesome.

The Rajapaksa administration's most obvious deficiencies have been relegated to the background and it has become the most effective executive presidency in its first term of office - due solely to the victorious war for which Fonseka deserves much credit. Gratitude will end with the vote at the presidential election with no likely spillover. The general election will be a different ball game.

At the end of his second term, Rajapaksa can be in peril, since he does not have the men or the machine to deliver the aspirations of the people, which are rated low as expectations. His cabinet or his parliamentarians or his administrative service or his presidential staff cannot perform to match the disciplined and trained armed forces on a command. Most stand devalued before the kick-off for a general election, where voting patterns will change from 2005 unless a charged tidal wave of support takes over. It will be a lacklustre list of candidates for the UPFA. Opting for one and not three on the ballot paper, will be difficult.

Does voting for a party at a general election matter any more, with the free flow of parliamentarians crossing the aisles, making the constitutional prohibition of changing parties, a mockery of the franchise due to expedient and unwarranted judicial decisions? Had the judiciary been sufficiently checked by public opinion without unwanted fears of contempt proceedings overshadowing it, the law would have taken its proper path to disable parliamentarians to go shopping for parties against the will of the electorate and the constitution. In the past, the crossings were made on the eve of an election in the fear of ouster, now it happens all season. Never were crossings more prevalent than during the last six years; yet no parliamentarian has forfeited his seat! Mostly saved by judicial orders.

There is no greater threat to democracy in Sri Lanka than a binding between a military mind and a legal mind to create a military-legal combine. All the military operations can be cured by orchestrated judicial pronouncements leaving the citizens helpless by a double punch. Any day the Rajapaksas, Wickremasinghes and Somawansas irrespective of their many flaws are a much safer alternative.