New Delhi must now deal with a vastly Strengthened Rajapakse at the Pinnacle of his Political Career
by K.Bhadrakumar
The Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa’s victory in the election held on Jan 26 becomes a defining moment for regional security. The speed with which western countries endorsed his victory has a deeper meaning than what meets the eye. It comes at the culmination of a barrage of condemnation of the Rajapaksa regime for the past several months. The acquiescence follows the unwarranted interference by the American embassy in Colombo during the peak of the election campaign expressing concern over a free and fair election.
Given the presidential system of government, Rajapaksa was indeed more equal than other candidates but his victory is convincing. The opposition alliance’s decision to field ex-army chief Sarath Fonseka as its common candidate was a mistake. Fonseka lacked the charisma or the savviness to take on an old war horse like Rajapaksa and his candidacy failed to impress the people.
There were other faultlines, too. Despite the Fonseka gaffe, the opposition vote bank probably remains intact at around 40 per cent, which underscores the level of public disaffection. It has implications for the forthcoming parliamentary elections where local issues and public grievances come into play.
Secondly, the Sinhala electorate voted overwhelmingly for Rajapaksa, while Fonseka polled exceedingly well in the Tamil and Muslim-dominated regions. How Rajapaksa defines his mandate of Sinhala nationalism remains an open question.
India should be pleased with Rajapaksa’s victory. Although Delhi kept aloof, there was no mistaking as to where its preference lay. A strong leadership in Colombo will be best placed to take tough decisions. Though the military victory over the LTTE has been conclusive, peace is far from won and deep wounds take time to heal. The time is approaching to reflect and begin to prepare a road map.
This is where Rajapaksa’s ‘fractured’ verdict becomes problematic. Sinhala nationalism historically acted as a brake on Colombo’s political willingness to accommodate Tamil minority aspirations. To what extent Rajapaksa dares to break out of the old paradigm is the big question. The Sinhala regions of the rural south, which gave him rock-like support, also happen to be the heartland of chauvinism that feeds on atavistic fears of Sri Lanka being the last remaining bastion of Theravada Buddhism.
Delhi has to tread warily while deploying its persuasive power with Rajapaksa to advance a political settlement of the Tamil problem. Having extended unstinted support to Colombo’s war efforts against the LTTE, Delhi ought to be in a position to harness peace dividends, but appearances sometimes can be deceptive. The plain truth is that Delhi now deals with a vastly strengthened Rajapaksa who is at the pinnacle of his political career. To put it mildly, the alchemy of the obscure interdependence between Delhi and Rajapaksa may have transformed to his advantage.
Meanwhile, a new template is appearing on the Sri Lankan political landscape. The United States is determined to fasten the ‘contested commons’ in the Indian Ocean (to use an idiom gaining currency with American strategic thinkers), which connect the Persian Gulf with the South China Sea. These ‘commons’ also happen to be a vital artery for China’s economy and, therefore, Sri Lanka becomes a vital chip in this developing great game.
Paradoxically, the competing rivalries enhance Colombo’s options. Rajapaksa has already been a beneficiary. All the Anglo-American pressure on Rajapaksa over his alleged war crimes came to nothing ultimately due to Moscow and Beijing’s support for him in the United Nations. The indications are that Washington is pragmatically reassessing the wisdom of driving Rajapaksa to a corner — just as it did a rethink recently on the Myanmar regime. But Rajapaksa is a tough grassroots politician. In all likelihood, he would prefer to offer a level playing field to all protagonists active in Colombo, while at the same time keeping the leash in his hands.
Much depends on the US policy. Left to himself, Rajapaksa will probably want to mend fences with Washington but there is a bottom line as there is great sensitivity about the last phase of the war against the LTTE. According to the Colombo grapevine, Rajapaksa has chosen Russia as the destination of his first visit abroad after the election. Without doubt, Sri Lanka is a key country for China and will be even more so as it develops an alternate transportation route to the Gulf region via Myanmar that reduces the dependence on Malacca Straits. All in all, China can be expected to further build on its presence in Sri Lanka. Beijing will be greatly thrilled at the prospect of Rajapaksa remaining at the helm of affairs.
Delhi did well to ignore the brouhaha raised by the West about Rajapaksa’s human rights record. But the US expects India to be its key partner in the Indian Ocean as part of its strategy to counter China. Delhi may have some hard choices to make in the period ahead, especially if Washington wades into the Tamil problem as a means to put pressure on the Rajapaksa government.
Aligning with the US policies toward Sri Lanka — or towards any of our neighbouring countries — do not serve India’s interests. Despite the vicissitudes in India-Sri Lankan ties, which are endemic to neighbouring countries of such manifest asymmetry, Delhi will always remain a privileged partner for Colombo. Our challenge is how to enrich the partnership with content.
(K.Bhadrakumar is a former diplomat of the Government of India who served in Sri Lanka as political secretary)
8 Comments
The reason for the General SF to lose the election was more due to the Government pressing on the so called pact with TNA than his charisma. We have seen this "pact" canard sinking many opposition campaigns. Truly, as a Sinhalese, if there was a "pact" with TNA to create real change for our Tamil citizens with real equal opportunity, it would have been better. I doubt if MR would ever do anything with APRC and that would be reason for the Centre (India) to meddle in Sri Lanka, to safeguard their interests in Tamilnadu.
And you folks did not like the General because he is "seen" by India as pro-China, pro-Pakistan and pro-USA. That is an unworkable alliance. But now there is greater probability that the "crouching tiger" will be a Dragon in the backyard of India. One day you will say that, India bet on the wrong horse, a second time.
I agree with you Max Headroom.
We hope and pray that MR t become PRO chineese.
From the beginning sri lanka try to play ball with big power's, indians wishing that it create level playing field is just plain ignorance as risky for India. In games
we play there always the losers (tamils, west, India) and winners(Singalse, china)
Sri Lanka is firmly taking anti western and anti democracy stance, the question
is where is India alliance stay ? Sri Lanka will be deciding factor for India.
Indian security has been compromised to level never seen in 60 years. Thanks to Sri Lanka.
Now that Rajapaksa has ruled out self rule for Tamils in his Independence Day speech. Its big slap in the face for all these so called moderate Tamils and federalist. Also to Indian diplomats who talked recently about self rule for Tamils.
The opposition vote bank of around 40% of those who voted, may increase by the number of those who did not vote in the election, if democratic governance is not restored before the pending parliamentary elections.
But signs are that the government is not in a hurry to do so.
The non arrest of the Presidential Security Division members who handed over the injured JVP member to the police before the election, and who subsequently died on the 4th February,of injuries sustained due to assault, shows that the government couldnt care less. If the opposition gains a majority due to these factors,there will be a conflict between the president and the opposition dominated parliament, in which case will MR dissolve parliament as Chandrika did to the UNP dominated parliament? India will watch but cannot interfere.The vociferous assertion by the Defence Secretary the "there will be no investigation" into allegged war crimes may alienate members of the international community who supported sri lanka during the last 'vote of confidence'.
The continued incarceration of many nothern tamils and assaults on those whe were freed by armed members of EPDP as alleged by SEP,may compel those who voted for MR and those who did not vote at all, to vote for the opposition in the parliamentary election.
A lot too depends on the level of violence and use of state media and resources which are almost sure to occur.
When the co chairs and the west decided to support the SL government to defeat the LTTE they had expected a certain number of casualties in the armed forces and the Civilians but when that exceeded the west had no nails left to bite but when it came to India they did not have any fingers left. India is the biggest loser not the Tamils from North and East the Indian citizens in the west agree to this line of thought some reason the policy makers in India dont agree They have missed the bus the second time.
Hereafter Delhi will be visiting Colombo not the other way about
Nathen
Every country should look at its own interests. Call for war crimes investigations, be damned. Respect for universal values, be damned. That is the message of Mr. Bhadrakumar, the former Indian diplomat. There is no longer any subtlety in it.
Coupled with the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee's recent report on Sri Lanka, what this shows activists is that the way to go ahead in bringing war criminals to justice is to exploit contradictions within Sri Lankan polity to get the desired outcome.
Countries like the US or India are highly unlikely to assist in prosecuting Sri Lanka's war criminals.
The JVP, Fonseka, the military purges, all provide enough of an opening toward the desired outcome, despite Rajapaksa winning the Presidential elections.
".. the Sinhala electorate voted overwhelmingly for Rajapaksa, while Fonseka polled exceedingly well in the Tamil and Muslim-dominated regions. How Rajapaksa defines his mandate of Sinhala nationalism remains an open question."
Did the Tamils have a popular choice between two contenders who claimed credit for the annihilation of a Tamil Terrorist Separatist outfit? Or was there any other reason why they went for SF? This needs a more deeper analysis than from the surface of the result.
From my own point of view there could be many reasons:
1. They strongly felt that they should exercise their franchise with a very hard choice.Majority of them were prevented from doing so.
2. They perceived that the words of MR were not supported by his deeds.
3. Paramilitary elements continued to torment them.
4. Law and order were deteriorating by the day.
5. Nepotism and corruption were eating into the core principles of democracy.
6. They needed to defy what is left of the terrorist elements and perhaps teach them a lesson.
7. They have run out of real leaders. In fact they did not have any for a very long time other than self appointed blood thirsty VP & Co.
We do know for a fact, that most of the people have made up their minds even before the TNA joined the SF alliance. TNA knew it. If they did join the UPFA, it would have exposed them and their real vote base.