Is anyone listening to what I've been saying since the war was won?
by Dayan Jayatilleka
Testimony by former senior officials at the Lessons Learnt panel has provided useful insights into what went wrong with policy perceptions, process and prescriptions during the CFA
Meanwhile the grapevine has it that the Royal Norwegian Government has called for tenders for academics and think tanks which can participate in its own ‘lessons learnt’ inquiry into what went wrong with its own efforts at a ‘peace process’ in Sri Lanka.
All this is necessary and useful. However, after thirty years of war, the crucial question remains, could any of the lessons now being learnt, actually have been predicted? Could any of this have been foreseen and avoided? Were there more accurate perceptions, assessments and analyses? Were other courses of action recommended?
Every Sri Lankan and Lankan-watching intellectual, policy commentator/analyst, ex-DPL ‘elder’, academic and Colombo-based diplomat should subject themselves to this test: what did they say at the time? How far wrong were they and why? Where and why did they get it wrong and how could that have happened?
The flip side of the coin also needs examination. Is it true that only a virulent strand of Sinhala nationalism got it right, or got it right first and got it mostly right? Is it correct that all contending strands of modernist-universalist provenance be they liberal, Marxist, or left-liberal, clung to the view that a military victory was impossible? Was this due to an intrinsic superiority of the ‘nativist’ or more politely, ‘indigenist’ perspective as distinct from a rational-modernist-universalist (‘Western/Westernised’) world view?
I shall reproduce extracts from two texts, the longer one from 1990, almost exactly twenty years ago, and the much shorter from 1993, and leave the reading public to exercise judgement and answer these questions.
The brief text is almost 18 years old, dates from the beginning of 1993, and is a gruelling five-page interview, almost an ideological interrogation, conducted by one of the best Tamil ultranationalist minds, DP Sivaram (alias ‘Taraki’). It appeared in The Northeastern Herald’s issue of January-February 1993, Volume 1, No 6, pp8-12. Readers will recall that the N.E. Herald is the publication that journalist and ex-detainee Tissainayagam was editing at the time of his arrest, having succeeded Sivaram in that post.
Particular attention is drawn to the question and answer about the possibility of a military victory over the LTTE. (The bold type is mine).
“Q. Which means it is possible for the Army in its current form to defeat the LTTE and restore the primacy of the democratic forces in Sri Lanka?
A. I think so. Of course, it will require enormous improvement in command and control, in strategy and tactics, in weapons systems and so on. But it can be done. It should and must be done.”
The interview was run by Sivaram with the caption ‘President Premadasa Should Be Little More of a Warmonger’ and is an abbreviation of the concluding remark by the interviewee: “Personally I would prefer President Premadasa to be a little more of a war-monger towards the LTTE than he has been so far!”
The 1990 text, i.e. dating from twenty years ago, deals with the question of understanding the Tigers and fashioning a strategy for negotiations. As is evident, the actual and potential disasters of the CFA and PTOMS respectively were clearly foreseeable and could have been designed in such a manner as to avoid disaster. The question is why did this not happen?
The 1990 text from which I share extracts was presented, with minor modifications, to two audiences, foreign and local. The first was at the Third Annual sessions of the Organization of Professionals Associations (OPA) dedicated to the theme ‘New Visions and New Initiatives for the Nineties’ held on October 4-6, 1990 at the BMICH in Colombo. The paper I quote from was classified under ‘Reducing Social Tensions’. The second, slightly longer version was presented days later at a seminar on Obstacles to Peace in Sri Lanka, organised by the Minority Rights Group, Swedish section, Sunnersta Herrgard, Uppsala, Sweden, October 7-10, 1990.
“I feel that the LTTE's current actions are quite consistent with their conduct over the years. Here. I am not referring to terrorism but rather to the fact that whenever there seemed to be a chance for a negotiated solution, the Tigers launched an attack so as to abort that possibility. You would recall that the attack on the 13 soldiers in July 1983 took place in a context in which President Jayewardene had finally invited the TULF to a roundtable discussion on Tamil grievances and terrorism. Prabakaran pre-empted it by the ambush...The Habarana massacre of 1987 and the Pettah bomb blast took place in early April just at the time that Mr. Athulathmudali, at the insistence of Dixit had announced a one week unilateral cessation of hostilities, restored telephone links and promised the lifting of the fuel embargo on Jaffna within weeks, if the ceasefire met with a positive response on the part of the Tigers. The LTTE reacted with the Habarana and Pettah attacks. These in turn provoked the aerial bombing of Jaffna, which the Tigers used to get international sympathy and Indian support. The Sri Lankan army followed the bombing with the Vadamaarachchi Operation. The rest is history.
My point then is that there is a certain pattern and consistency in the Tigers behaviour which we must discern and comprehend. Their conduct is not random, arbitrary, illogical. The pattern can be understood if we study their history just as Lord Buddha used to refer to the conduct of certain persons in their previous incarnations, so as to point out the consistent pattern.
What is the pattern?
(1) They fear a negotiated settlement through reforms because that will undercut their armed struggle and will be a substitute for their maximum goal. This is also the reason why the JVP opposed genuine negotiations.
(2) Therefore, they do everything possible to de-rail negotiations and force the 'closing off' of reformist options. They seek to polarize the situation so that armed struggle is the only option.
(3) They seek to discredit, undermine and annihilate all Tamil moderate political entities which would abandon the armed struggle and settle for less than Eelam.
(4) They try to provoke the Sinhala Armed Forces into massacring Tamil and Muslim civilians, the Sinhala people into starting ethnic riots and the Sinhala Government into calling off the search for a reform package. In this way, they polarize the situation and gain legitimacy or their form of struggle (violence) and for their goal (Eelam and nothing less).
...I believe that Prabakaran does not want any real reforms which will undercut his Eelam struggle. He did not and does not want the Tamil people and his cadres to get accustomed to a prolonged peace. Therefore he created incidents, situations of tension and finally precipitated the conflicts. The period before June 11th 1990 reminds me of two other phases that after the signing of the Accord in July '87 and the beginning of hostilities with the IPKF in October 1987 and earlier, the period before July '83.
..This does not mean that we must write off the negotiated settlement option. However we must bear in mind that the L TTE, like the JVP, is not a rational revolutionary guerrilla movement. Such liberation movements (e.g. Salvadoran FMLN, Zimbabwe's Zanu, the PLO) are usually amenable to negotiated solutions. The LTTE (like the JVP) is a fanatical movement which will not stop short of its maximum goaIs. The cyanide capsule is the best example of this, No other guerrilla/liberation movement has such a practice - except for certain individual agents on special missions. The Tigers are like the Japanese fascists in World War II the Kamikaze pilots. Therefore a negotiated settlement is that much more difficult. Even if one is arrived at, it is doubtful that they will adhere to it. Still, it is best to try...
...One of the few - very few - advantages the SLA have in this war, is experience. The SLA has fought a war with the Tigers before and some of us have also keenly observed the IPKF - LTTE war. If we derive the correct lessons from these, we can avoid certain errors, minimize our losses, shorten the war and also reduce the adverse political consequences that may flow from this conflict.”
Space constraints prevented the paragraphs below, which were in the Uppsala seminar paper (all papers were reprinted in LANKA, Uppsala University) being in the OPA’s printed digest.
“...I do not mean that the Government should negotiate insincerely as it did with Tamil groups including the TULF during the JRJ - Harry Jayewardene-Athulathmudali years. What I mean is that:
(i) The Government must not permit the LTTE to gain unilateral advantage through and during the talks and
(ii) That battlefield gains of the Government should not be bartered away at the negotiating table. This is what happened when the Accord was signed - though perhaps that was unavoidable then. This must not be repeated. A negotiated settlement must accurately reflect the battlefield situation, the prevailing correlation of forces. The Sri Lankan side must not be tricked or pressured into giving up at the negotiating table what it has won on the battleground.”
No prizes for guessing the interviewee of the ’93 Sivaram interview or the presenter at the ’90 symposia in Uppsala and Colombo. It was yours truly, this writer, (at the time in my early and mid 30s respectively). In 1990, I still entertained the possibility as an ‘outlier’ scenario, of a negotiated endgame with regional and international support, provided it was informed by the tough-minded Realist perspective I had set out. The early ’93 text shows that I was decidedly no longer of that view. What had changed? The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi proved that Prabhakaran was uninterested in and incapable of a negotiated final settlement, while the fall of the USSR and the shift to uni-polarity meant that Sri Lanka could no longer count on a balance in international institutions.
Is anyone listening to what I’ve been saying since the war was won?
16 Comments
http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/inclusion-the-way-to-real-peace-20090315-8yv7.html?page=-1
Inclusion the way to real peace by Howard Debenham(a former Australian Ambassador 1992-1994 to Sri Lanka), 6 March 2009:
'' ... When a small group of uniquely qualified Americans and a former Australian high commissioner quietly tried, working with the highest levels of the Sri Lankan Government, to build capacity for statesmanship and progress before peace talks with the LTTE scheduled for Geneva in October of that year, Sri Lanka's leaders only pretended to listen, and so doomed a country and a people once so full of promise to more mindless death and destruction, the worst of which may yet be to come.''
http://www.adb.org/documents/reports/rebuilding-sri-lanka/trincomalee-team.pdf
Centralisation. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, a district task force was established to allow all major political actors in Trincomalee District to come together. Members of the task force included the government, local politicians including the TNA and the JVP, the army, the police, the LTTE and representatives from the UN, ICRC, INGOs and LNGOs. Although the task force faced problems from the beginning - mainly due to the fact that many issues became heavily politicised – it was working well and decisions taken were implemented. Despite having a functioning mechanism in place, the Government by the middle of February formed a new structure, the Council for Rebuilding Trincomalee District. Unfortunately, the council met only once in February and has not been active since then.
http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/06B7033C-446F-407F-BF58-7D4A71425BFF/0/ApproachestoEquity.pdf
Approaches to equity in post-Tsunami assistance. Sri Lanka: A case study, Mandeep Kaur Grewal(DfID), 2006: ''The Office of the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery commissioned this review on equity issues arising from post-tsunami response, using Sri Lanka as a case study. ... The example of the District Secretary(Trincomalee, Northeast Sri Lanka), who was undermined in developing a standard coordination process that other districts were able to implement, contrasts sharply with Hambantota’s housing experience, where conventional bureaucratic norms and systems of accountability were set aside, allowing the district to respond comparatively faster in planning reconstruction..... over provision of house reconstruction in the south, which clearly indicates an inequitable allocation of resources from a national perspective.....
The post-tsunami period in Sri Lanka brought more sharply into focus the serious shortcomings of over-centralized policy development and implementation, although this has long been informally recognized as undermining the prospects for development in Sri Lanka.''
What a Machiavellian stunt from a yours truly ! Why can not Dayan J come out with more truth about why he and Sivaram were in the same group in the past, what were some common objectives ( real or fake, patriotic or un patriotic ) they had, who were the others in their group, why Dayan broke away from Sivaram & others or vice versa, who killed D.Sivaram and why, who killed Lasantha and why and the rest ?
These are very pertinent questions that have to be answered as it is relevant to the credibility of any Oracle on Lankan matters. Then we the forum participants can truly believe the yours truly and we do not need to go to ones previous birth as Lord Buddha did. At least Jayantha Dhanapala said the blame should go also to each regime ( Sinhalese ) that ruled Srilanka since 1948 or some thing to that effect.
What DJ is painting is there were no Oracles from Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims, Burghwers who shouted loud and clear even in the parliament of so called democratic Srilanka before LTTE was born. To DJ records in ""Hansard "" prior to 1972 or prior to 1978 is like BC pact or DC pact. Only his records and what he says are precious and relavant.
Development Dilemmas: Challenges of Working in Conflict and Post Conflict situations in South Asia, DFID Conference, 5 - 6 March 2007: ‘’Economic growth is not an alternative to political conflict resolution. In Sri Lanka donor pressure to address development issues and post conflict reconstruction in 2002/3 could not make up for the lack of political progress in dealing with the central issue of the conflict. Aid became a distraction from the peace process, and then a point of division. Donors had inflated ideas about the importance of economic incentives, whereas for the LTTE the political factors were far more important.''
Disaster Response, Peace and Conflict in Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka, Part 1: The Congestion of Humanitarian Space, Simon Harris, February 2006(University of Bradford, UK):
‘’ Had international humanitarian interventions understood the dynamics of conflict and the role of assistance in informing such relationships, they might actually have helped contribute to peace building by tackling the underlying structures and root causes, or more minimally, by at least not making situations worse... Members of the Sinhalese community expressed concern that the distribution of fishing boats by INGO’s to individuals meant that Tamils could now own their means of production rather than renting it from the local Sinhalese ‘fisher barons’. Furthermore, they did not need the cash loans, which had previously shackled them to a relationship of debt repayment with the Sinhalese moneylenders, because the state benefits for housing reconstruction and INGO support for livelihood development were covering their major overheads. New access to markets also enabled them to bi-pass the traditional middleman who, in Trincomalee, were also generally from the Sinhalese community. The perceived threat to Sinhalese livelihood resources was also being appropriated and reinforced by nationalist political interests, such as the JVP, towards violent expression in protest over Government proposals for a Joint Mechanism with the LTTE.’’
The present LLRC is myopic to the extent of post 2003 and hence cannot deal with the root causes of the problem. Hence it can deal only with issues like CFA and PTOMs. Specifically to find fault with the regimes immedaiately preceding the present and to accolade its achievements.
The reasons why the LTTE could not be defeated previously was the lack of Political and Miltary resolve. The acquisition of modern arms, the military and political leadership, military strategy and foreign approval post 9/11, all played a part in effectively checkmating and finally defeating the LTTE.
Now we are in a position where we would like to have a stable govt, peaceful coexistence, economic development and hence it is neccesary to make up and reconcile with those who once sided with the LTTE.
Instead the Govt is bent on consolidating the power of the executive so that it could prolong its tenure and impose nationalistic home made policies in the North and East as well as the rest of the country over the next 15-20 yrs. The Govt hopes to make Sri Lanka the miracle of Asia without uniting the country and alienating a sizable number of its population consisting of the Poor and the Minorities.
So most probably no one is listening.
the whole issue is due to the failure of the political system to genuinely address the tamil grivenge.
can you open your eyes and mind and learn some think from singapore government and system. it will be useful.
at least when living singapore, admire it.
Aid, Conflict & Peace Building in Sri Lanka 2000 – 2005, J.
Goodhand and B. Klem(2006)
''In spite of the ceasefire agreement and peace negotiations, the structural dimensions of the conflict within Sri Lanka have remained relatively stable. There has been no "seismic shift" in the "tectonic
plates" underpinning conflict in Sri Lanka. The constellation of factors that contributed to the outbreak and sustenance of violent conflict - including the nature of the state, its political culture, the institutional framework of policy, uneven development patterns and competing nationalisms - remains largely unaffected by the peace process.''
USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE : SRI LANKA ASSESSMENT, December2006:
Donor-funded peace building efforts are often disconnected from structural changes in the state; conflict exists not simply because people don't like each other but because of unjust institutions and
structures. Without fixing the institutions and structures, it is not clear how much progress can be made in working with communities alone.
Nope ! Any idea why they should ?
No Sir, no one will listen
to your cry -least of all
the man who matters - M.R
and family presently!
Even Commissions will NOT
learn from theoreticals -
as the desiring factor is
POWER, POLITICAL POWER OF
THE MAJORITY, however
abusive it is, does
not matter at all.
Securing Peace: An Action Strategy for Sri Lanka - A Report prepared by Princeton University for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2004:
''Decades of Sinhalese state-sponsored institutional discrimination against the Tamil minority polarized the two major communities and created inequalities that persist to this day''.
‘’In our view, resolution of the Sinhalese political party struggle is the top priority. This conflict—whatever the merits of the arguments—is selfish in the short-term and selfdefeating in the long-term. The country is ready for peace. The LTTE is ready to continue negotiations. The world cannot understand why Sri Lanka does not move ahead to peace. All parties need to seize this moment, honor their constituents’ faith in them, and settle their dispute immediately. The critical next steps we explore in this report will go unaddressed if this issue is not resolved immediately.’’
One word answer, No!
"Meanwhile the grapevine has it that the Royal Norwegian Government has called for tenders for academics and think tanks which can participate in its own ‘lessons learnt’ inquiry into what went wrong with its own efforts at a ‘peace process’ in Sri Lanka."
I assume you are going be on the first plane out to Oslo, peddling your 'expertise' in return for some kroner!
Tenders for academics and think-tanks??? The lowest price for the highest quality or the highest price for the lower quality. Tender-benders we have plenty in our Isle. When do they get a chance to get to work and show their unmatched world class?
ISS
We listen to what you say Dayan, but we don't take it seriously. It's entertaining though.
Keep up the good work!
What is the pattern?
Ethnic outbidding of 50s/60s continued into CFA era.
I am not a wordsmith like Dayan.
Put all the things that went on between UNP and SLFP in 2002/3/4 .... and all the things that didn't go into building peace constituency from the constituency made putrid by hate-mongering textbooks of the last 50/60 yrs.
That would ba story for a terrific film.
Dear Rationalman,
I was invited to join by a think tank in South Asia which is applying -- but I did not accept. Why should I? I have been invited by the Singaporean think tank where I am based, to write my own book. That's what brought me here.
Dear Romesh Bandari Dixit from Nalanada,
Why "Dayan broke from Sivaram?" Man, Sivaram was my translator into Tamil when I was addressing the Marumalarchik Kalagham on Jaffna campus, on the subject of the Nicaraguan Revolution! If you'd read SR, and especially that interview, you'd see that he was talking about the influence of my writings in the late 1970s!